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From the beginning, it sounded too good to be true. Like a modem-day
inventor announcing that she has constructed the world's safest, most
environmentally sound, yet fastest and most powerful mode of
transportation, the Constitution's Framers boasted that they had crafted a
presidency both deeply efficacious and unthreatening to liberty. What is
more, the Framers explained that a single ingredient, when added to the
Constitution's other structural elements, would facilitate both qualities.
That ingredient was unity, whereby one person, not a multi-member body,
would serve as President, and the presidency would have no constitutionally
annexed council. Unity, promised the Framers and other founding era
constitutional proponents, would create "energy" and accountability. With
respect to the former, Alexander Hamilton stated in the Federalist that
"[u]nity is conducive to energy" because "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number . . ,"
With respect to the latter, Hamilton assured fellow Founders in the very
same essay that unity would also conduce to accountability. He explained
that "multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection,"
including the "opportunity of discovering [misconduct] with facility and
clearness." One person "will be more narrowly watched and most readily
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suspected."2 This assurance-that the new presidency's structure would
support both energy and accountability-was echoed throughout the
framing and ratification debates.3
Of course, unity by itself could not achieve all of these benefits. To
differentiate the new President from a monarch, the Founders explained that
unity would combine with other structural innovations-including
presidential election, impeachment, Congress' power to declare war, and
the Senate's shared role in the appointment and treaty processes-to
balance energy and accountability.4 Perhaps the most delicate mechanisms
in this promised structure were those to control information. A key
component of the energy trumpeted by the Founders was secrecy. Yet
founding assurances of presidential accountability assumed transparency. It
is no accident, after all, that Hamilton spoke of accountability as a product
of the executive's being "watched." Other constitutional supporters
similarly assumed transparency when they spoke of unity and
accountability. For example, William Davie, championing ratification in
North Carolina, explained that the Framers' predominant reason for creating
a unitary presidency was:
the more obvious responsibility of one person. It was observed that,
if there were a plurality of persons, and a crime should be
committed, when their conduct was to be examined, it would be
impossible to fix the fact on any one of them, but that the public
were never at a loss when there was but one man.'
Similarly, a constitutional proponent wrote in the Virginia Independent
Chronicle that "secrecy and dispatch" will attach to the unitary presidential
office. Yet the author placed greater emphasis on the fact that "[t]he United
States are the scrutinizing spectators of [the President's] conduct, and he
will, always, be the distinguished object of political jealousy."6
How might one reconcile these twin founding promises that Presidents
would act both secretly and transparently? Were the Founders "lying
liars?"7 Were they delusional? Elsewhere, I have argued that the seeming
2. Id at 426-27, 429.
3. See infra note 4.
4. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 414-21; 9 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION BY THE
STATES, VIRGINIA 1097-98 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1990); 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 141 (essay of Tench Coxe)
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); id. at 495 (statement from Pennsylvania ratification debates).
5. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 347 (Max Farrand, ed., Yale
Univ. Press 1966).
6. 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
RATIFICATION BY THE STATES, VIRGINIA, supra note 4, at 245 (quoting VA. INDEP. CHRON.).
7. This term was famously used, albeit in an entirely different context and not in reference
to the Founders, by (now) U.S. Senator from Minnesota, Al Franken. See AL FRANKEN, LIES
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contradiction is reconciled in the Constitution's ingenious structure for
information control.8 For ease of reference, I refer to this structure as the
constitutional framework of "dynamic vigilance." At the core of dynamic
vigilance is the basic rule of macro-transparency: while laws may authorize
the President to execute them in secret (or with "micro-secrecy"), the laws
themselves are transparent (or "macro-transparent"). Another key
component of dynamic vigilance is the Constitution's provision for an array
of "accountability tools." Congress has much leeway to create such tools
through its powers under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. For example,
Congress can pass and has passed legislation requiring the executive branch
to keep the congressional intelligence committees apprised of intelligence
programs and activities. Such information-sharing measures support and
maintain macro-transparency. Without such tools, there would be little to
stop the executive branch from secretly circumventing statutory
requirements, and thus from transforming micro-secret programs into
macro-secrets. Macro-secrets are those about which outsiders-in this case
Congress, the courts, and the public-are unaware and thus cannot even try
to check.9 Other accountability tools are provided by the Constitution
directly. For example, the First Amendment supports the rights to free
speech and a free press, and there is widespread agreement among free
speech theorists that the First Amendment exists at least partly to facilitate
self-government.'" Indeed, in championing the original Constitution-
which did not, of course, contain a Bill of Rights but which constitutional
proponents argued did not authorize Congress to limit the press"-
proponents were able to point to "the free press" "[a]s a safeguard against
(AND THE LYING LIARS WHO TELL THEM): A FAIR AND BALANCED LOOK AT THE RIGHT (2003).
8. 1 have not previously used the term "dynamic vigilance." Otherwise, however, the bulk of
this paragraph elaborates on ideas that I have introduced elsewhere. See generally Heidi Kitrosser,
Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 881 (2008); Heidi Kitrosser,
Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2008); Heidi Kitrosser, "Macro-Transparency" as Structural Directive:
A Look at the NSA Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163 (2007); Heidi Kitrosser,
Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489 (2007).
9. The concepts of "macro" and "micro" secrecy parallel in important respects those of
"deep" and "shallow" secrecy. For more discussion on deep and shallow secrets see, e.g., AMY
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 121-26 (1996); KIM LANE
SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 21-22 (1988);
David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260-61 (2010); Kitrosser, Secrecy and
Separated Powers, supra note 8, at 493-94.
10. See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the
Right to Know in the Administrative State, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 126-29 (2004).
(arguing that self-government and its underlying theoretical premises form part of virtually every
major theory of free-speech value); see also, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26-27 (The Lawbook Exch. 2000); THOMAS I. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970).
11. See, e.g., 5 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 122 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1987) (quoting 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 448-50 (James Wilson, Penn. Ratifying Convention)).
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abuses."' 2
To these elements of dynamic vigilance I would add one more-the
very limited constitutional room to depart from statutory restrictions. I refer
to this as "extraordinary prerogative." Presidential energy and historic
rationales for the same suggest that the President must have discretion to act
unilaterally to preserve the nation when, but only when, there is no time for
Congress first to enact or amend statutes to avert catastrophe. 3 The limited
nature of this exception is as crucial as its substance. Without such
limitation the exception would swallow the constitutional rule that
lawmaking must be a deliberative, collaborative, and macro-transparent
process. Any deviations from statutory limits thus must be timed to
coincide not only with an emergency but with the period in that emergency
before new legislation can reasonably be sought through the ordinary law-
making process. These limits can only be enforced through accountability
mechanisms like those described above. For example, absent some degree
of First Amendment protection for internal executive branch whistleblowers
and the press, congressional power to demand information about executive
branch activities, and judicial power to scrutinize executive efforts to block
lawsuits through state secrets claims, the President could too easily hide
transgressions.
The notion of extraordinary prerogative owes a debt to John Locke's
concept of executive prerogative, with which the Constitution's Founders
were deeply familiar. The basic idea of Lockean prerogative is that an
executive may at times be warranted in acting without or even against legal
authority to address emergencies. However, whether the actions are
warranted are for the people to judge. Furthermore, where an executive acts
in the absence of, or against legislation in response to unforeseeable events,
he is expected to do so only until "the [legislature] can conveniently be
assembled to provide" appropriate legislation. 4
Political and legal theorists have applied derivations of Lockean
prerogative to the U.S. Constitution. A key contribution of these derivations
is the notion that the people or their representatives must have an
opportunity to review and deliberate on an act of prerogative shortly after
the fact in order to ratify or punish it. Some argue, for example, that the
12. DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 34
(1981).
13. Cf, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 173 (1994) (recounting
argument made by Madison and Gerry at constitutional convention that the Executive must be
empowered to "repel sudden attacks").
14. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 421-27 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1963);
see also BENJAMIN A. KLEINERMAN, THE DISCRETIONARY PRESIDENT: THE PROMISE AND PERIL
OF EXECUTIVE POWER 67 (2009) (explaining Locke's view that, if the executive exercises
prerogative outside of "the standing laws for the public good," "a properly designed Constitution
should seek that the 'Legislative' soon 'be Assembled to provide for it').
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President may exceed the Constitution in an emergency but that he must
then throw himself on the judgment of Congress or the people. 5 Some
members of the founding and early post-founding generations took this
view. 16 Others have argued that subsequent ratification can retroactively
make such actions constitutional.' 7 Under either variant, mechanisms of
dynamic vigilance are crucial to prevent the President from cloaking or
misrepresenting his actions so that they cannot meaningfully be judged.18
The dynamic vigilance framework stands in sharp contrast to an
increasingly influential school of thought that I refer to here as "presidential
supremacy." Presidential supremacists read the President's constitutional
powers to preclude Congress or the courts from limiting, overseeing, or
otherwise checking presidential actions in many cases. Supremacy
encompasses, but is not limited to, the school of thought sometimes called
"exclusivity." Exclusivity is the view that statutes that unduly restrict the
President's discretion in either his commander-in-chief or executive
capacity are unconstitutional. 9 Exclusivity has received some sustained
scholarly attention of late.2" This is fitting, as exclusivity has risen from
near-obscurity to substantial influence over the past several decades.2' For
purposes of this article, exclusivity is important for the threat that it poses to
the transparency and accountability mechanisms that the Constitution builds
around the Presidency's capacities. Most obviously, exclusivity poses such
a threat to the extent that it justifies presidential circumvention of statutory
openness requirements. It poses an even larger threat, however, where it is
15. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1099-1100, 1111-15 (2003); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The
President and the Law, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 321-24, 329-30 (1952).
16. See Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385,
1392-97 (1989); Wilmerding, supra note 15, at 323-29, 338.
17. See KLEINERMAN, supra note 14, at 9-10.
18. On a similar note, many scholars observe that while President Lincoln took a number of
actions without prior congressional consent and of questionable constitutionality in the midst of
the Civil War, he did so transparently and threw himself on the judgment of Congress to ratify or
reject his actions after the fact. See, e.g., Michael A. Genovese, The Roots and Development of
Executive Prerogative in the United States, paper presented at 2009 Annual Meeting of American
Political Science Association, 21-22, 24-25; KLEINERMAN, supra note 14, at 177-87; DANIEL
FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 24, 137-38, 194-95 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping and
Article 11 Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1401-02 (2010) (describing exclusivist reasoning);
David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander-in-chief at the Lowest Ebb-A
Constitutional History, 121 HARv. L. REV. 941, 1027 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman 11]
(invoking the term "presidential exclusivity" to describe this school of thought); David J. Barron
& Martin S. Lederman, The Commander-in-chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem,
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 694 (2008) [hereinafter Barron &
Lederman 1] (describing exclusivist reasoning).
20. See supra note 19.
21. See Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 1405-06, 1421-33; id. at nn. 126-28 and accompanying
text (citing to Barron & Lederman 11, supra note 19, and Barron & Lederman 1, supra note 19, for
their findings as to the relative newness of exclusivity).
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used to justify secret law. Secret law occurs when the President not only
circumvents a statute, but when he does so in secret. In such cases, the
President effectively amends public law without the knowledge of the
public or the other branches and without going through the macro-
transparent processes mandated by Article I, § 7 of the Constitution.
Exclusivity does not exist in isolation, which is why I refer to the larger
school of thought-presidential supremacy-of which it forms a part. It is
important to understand this larger school of thought for at least two
reasons. First, supremacist arguments, taken together, are directed against
virtually every means through which presidential misdeeds may be brought
to light by members of the executive branch, by the other branches, or by
the press and the people. The reasoning that underlies exclusivity-the
notion that the other branches may not unduly restrict the President's
discretion as commander-in-chief or chief executive-also supports the
supremacist view that an executive decision to classify information obviates
any First Amendment concerns over criminally punishing conveyance of
the same. It further underscores supremacist arguments to the effect that
courts should defer to executive and state secrets privilege claims without
examining the documents at issue. This Article describes four forms of
supremacist reasoning directed against transparency-based checks on the
executive: executive privilege, state secrets privilege, exclusivist arguments
in support of secret law, and "classified speech" arguments to the effect that
classifying information effectively removes it from the protections of the
First Amendment.
Understanding this array of arguments helps one to grasp supremacy's
implications for the structural balance between energy and accountability,
and between secrecy and transparency. At its core, supremacy conflates the
President's energetic capacities, including secrecy, with a constitutional
right to exercise the same in the face of inter-branch checks. From the
perspective of dynamic vigilance, supremacy halves the constitutional plan,
clearing away the accountability mechanisms that are meant to block abuses
of presidential energy.
The trouble is not that supremacists ignore accountability completely.
Rather, they seem to assume that supremacy leaves avenues for
accountability open or even enhances accountability. A typical refrain, for
example, is that while supremacy may prevent Congress from curtailing
certain national security programs, Congress is free to cut off funding for or
investigate such programs, and individuals wronged by them are free to
bring lawsuits alleging statutory or common law violations.22 Supremacists
22. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 125-56 (2006); Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 131, 134-35, 137-38
(1978) (testimony of Robert Bork).
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add that the degree of presidential control that they champion enhances
accountability because it makes it easy for the public to understand who to
blame-the President, naturally-should they dislike particular programs.2 3
Yet such arguments overlook supremacy's impact on the ability of
Congress, the people, and the courts to know or learn of the information
that would enable them to take responsive actions through oversight,
litigation, or voting.
A second reason to analyze supremacist arguments involving
information control as a group is the light that such analysis sheds on their
common features. Viewing the arguments together, for example, enables
one to identify as a common core the conflation of presidential capacities
with a legal entitlement to exercise the same in the face of inter-branch
checks. It also illuminates the fact that supremacist claims exist on a larger
spectrum of arguments-ranging from more to less radical-that reason
from the President's capacities. In the classified speech context, for
example, executive appeals for serious judicial consideration of the
executive's dangerousness judgment that do not preclude the judiciary's
making the ultimate substantive determination under the First Amendment
are not particularly radical and do not warrant the supremacist label. This is
a very different thing from an argument to the effect that the executive's
decision to classify a piece of information effectively removes any First
Amendment protections-and thus any substantive judicial role-regarding
conveyance of the same.
Overall, then, this article has two main goals, and they are largely
descriptive. First, it explores major supremacist arguments and their
potentially deep impact on transparency and accountability. Second, it seeks
to shed more light on supremacist reasoning, the range of supremacist
argument, and the relationship between supremacist claims and other less
radical claims. These observations have obvious normative implications.
Indeed, I have already suggested here my own view that supremacy's
relationship to information control calls into question its constitutional
legitimacy. Furthermore, recognizing that not all executive privilege, state
secrets, or classified speech claims are equally radical can undermine
supremacist arguments that equate relatively non-radical historical
examples with far more radical contemporary claims. Yet, while I make no
bones about these normative implications, this article's major, immediate
23. See, e.g., MINORITY REPORT, in REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 100-433, S. REP. NO. 100-216, at 460
(1987) (Founders left national security and foreign affairs largely to the President in part for
democratic reasons: "there would be no way for the people to hold any one person accountable for
a legislative decision."); cf YOO, supra note 22, at 180 (noting that "[o]ur nation had a
presidential and congressional election after Abu Ghraib and the leaking of the OLC memos. If
the people had disagreed with administration policies, they could have made a change.").
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goals are the descriptive ones just identified.
Part I elaborates on the concept of supremacy and its major
justifications. Part II explains that supremacist claims exist along a
spectrum ranging from non-radical, non-supremacist arguments (for
example, claims that assert some but not total deference to presidential
secrecy judgments and that do not assert exclusivity, or a right to
circumvent statutes) to very radical supremacist claims (such as those that
assert an exclusivist right to secretly circumvent statutes). Part III elaborates
on four types of supremacist claims and their relationships to transparency.
I. PRESIDENTIAL SUPREMACY: THE CONCEPT INTRODUCED
Supremacists read the President's constitutional powers to preclude
Congress or the courts from limiting, overseeing, or otherwise checking
presidential actions in many cases. Rather than a single theory, supremacy
can more accurately be described as an interpretive tendency with multiple
manifestations. Below, I discuss several major forms of supremacy and
their justifications. Initially, however, I wish to explain the more basic
textual and historical points that underlie supremacy generally.
One core justification for supremacy is that the President has a duty to
protect national security that cannot constitutionally be compromised by
legislative or judicial restrictions.24 The second core justification for
supremacy is that the President has a constitutional discretion to protect the
confidentiality of high-level executive branch communications and that this
discretion may not be unduly hindered by legislative or judicial
information-sharing demands.25
These justifications are not always linked explicitly to particular
constitutional clauses. When supremacists do draw such links, however,
they tend to focus on one or both of two clauses. The first is Article II's
Vesting Clause. It reads, "The executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America."26 Supremacists start with the
notion-sometimes called the "Vesting Clause thesis" 27-- that the clause
does not merely introduce the more specific powers and duties subsequently
detailed in Article II, such as the power to appoint judges and executive
branch officers "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate."28
24. See Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 1401-02.
25. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 70-72.
26. U.S. CONST., art. 11, § 1, cl. 1.
27. See Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 375, 376 (2008) (referring to the "Article 1I Vesting Clause thesis" as "one of the most
hotly debated propositions in modem constitutional law").
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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Rather, the clause is itself a grant of substantive power.2 9 Supporters of the
Vesting Clause thesis argue that, at the time of the founding, the term
"executive power" was understood by educated persons to encompass the
prerogatives of the British Crown, including exclusive control over foreign
affairs and national security. Through the Vesting Clause, the Founders
bequeathed these prerogatives to the President, excepting only those parts
explicitly delegated to the Senate or the Congress as a whole in other parts
of Articles I or 11° This scheme is confirmed by constitutional text and
structure, say Vesting Clause proponents. For example, they contrast the
language of Article II's Vesting Clause with that of Article I's Vesting
Clause. Article I explicitly vests Congress only with "all legislative Powers
herein granted."'" The difference in language, they say, indicates that
Article II's Vesting Clause does more than simply reference powers
enumerated elsewhere in Article II. Rather, it grants all powers that the
Founders understood to be executive in nature, with the exception only of
those explicitly delegated elsewhere.3"
Of course, even if an interpreter supports the Vesting Clause thesis,
they still must determine what "the executive power" meant to the founding
generation, and what parts of it were left to the President and not delegated
elsewhere in the Constitution. Depending on one's answers to these
questions, exclusivity need not follow from the thesis.33 For example, some
modem proponents of the Vesting Clause thesis have advanced it only to
support a fairly modest set of powers-such as powers to articulate foreign
policy or "protective" powers-that are subject to statutory limits.34
29. JOHN YOO, CRISIS & COMMAND 35, 43-47 (2009); Lawson, supra note 27, 389-91. For
earlier supremacist uses of the Vesting Clause thesis, see, e.g., Lawrence J. Block & David B.
Rivkin, Jr., The Battle to Control the Conduct of Foreign Intelligence and Covert Operations: The
Ultra-Whig Counterrevolution Revisited, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 307-20 (1989);
Robert F. Turner, The Constitution and the Iran-Contra Affair: Was Congress the Real
Lawbreaker?, II HoUs. J. INT'L. L. 83, 91-99 (1988-89).
30. See infra n. 32. For uses of the Vesting Clause not necessarily supremacist in nature, see
infra nn. 34-35 and accompanying text.
31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § I (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 27, at 390. Supporters also cite the plain language of the
Vesting Clause, the etymology of the word "vest," the analogy between its uses in Article II and
Article Ill, and the fact that it is used to signify a substantive grant of power elsewhere in the
Constitution. Id. at 386-88 (summarizing arguments made elsewhere by Lawson, Guy Seidman,
Christopher Moore, Steven Calabresi and Kevin Rhodes).
33. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 38 (2006) ("The content of the 'executive Power' granted to the President by the Vesting
Clause is an issue separate from whether the Article 11 Vesting Clause grants power."); Curtis A.
Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 545, 553 (2004) ("even if the Article II Vesting Clause were read as a power-conferring
provision, the argument would not tell us which powers the Clause encompasses").
34. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 22-24, 31-32, 38, 65-66, 69-74 (1993). (deeming the executive power to include a
limited protective power to act absent statutory authority, but not to act against statutory
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Furthermore, some scholars who rely on the Vesting Clause thesis to
support a separate theory-unitary executive theory-have explicitly
distanced themselves from aspects of supremacy.35
What sets supremacists apart in their use of the Vesting Clause is this:
through their readings of "the executive power" and of constitutional
clauses that distribute parts of that power outside of the presidency,
supremacists find a wide berth of presidential discretion that is supreme
over contrary congressional or judicial actions. Among other things,
supremacists find fairly broad presidential prerogatives to determine when
Congress and the judiciary must be kept in the dark or when statutory
directives should be ignored. These conclusions are deeply tied to both their
reading of history and their conflation of the President's structural
capacities with a constitutional discretion to exercise the same as he
chooses. For example, in explaining why supremacist conclusions follow
from the Vesting Clause, John Yoo writes:
At the time of the Constitution's framing, executive power was
understood to include the war, treaty, and other general foreign
affairs powers. . . . Thus, when the Framers ratified the
Constitution, they would have understood that [the Vesting Clause]
continued the Anglo-American constitutional tradition of locating
the foreign affairs power generally in the executive branch.
Hamilton and the other Federalists did not look to the executive to
manage war and peace for tradition's sake. They understood the
executive to be functionally best matched in speed, unity, and
decisiveness to the unpredictable high-stakes nature of foreign
affairs. As Edward Corwmi observed, the executive's advantages in
foreign affairs include: "[T]he unity of office, its capacity for
secrecy and dispatch, and its superior sources of information, to
which should be added the fact that it is always on hand and ready
authority); see also, e.g., Lawson & Seidman, supra note 33, at 41-42, 45-62 (describing a
residual executive power over foreign affairs that is not clearly or necessarily supremacist in
nature); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs,
I I I YALE L.J. 231, 234-35, 253-56, 262-65 (2001) (describing residual executive foreign affairs
powers that do not preclude roles for Congress, though reading some important limits into the
latter); id. at 238-40 (criticizing theories of "presidential primacy" in foreign affairs).
35. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 18-21 (2008)
("[t]he classic vision of the unitary executive"... "had absolutely nothing to do with claims of
implied, inherent presidential domestic and foreign policy power of the kind asserted by the
[George W. Bush] administration"). But see Julian G. Ku, Unitary Executive Theory and
Exclusive Presidential Powers, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 615, 615-16, 621 (2010) (arguing that
unitary executive theory itself is a form of presidential exclusivity); John C. Yoo, Unitary,
Executive, or Both?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1935, 1937-38, 1965-66, 1976-85 (2009) (positing that
the reasoning underlying unitary executive theory also supports supremacy).
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for action, whereas the houses of Congress are in adjournment much
of the time."36
Gary Lawson employs similar reasoning, albeit more tentatively and
indirectly, to conclude that the Vesting Clause empowers the President to
conduct wartime intelligence gathering operations that Congress likely
cannot restrict. In explaining that the Vesting Clause encompasses such
exclusive powers, Lawson cites among other things to a defense of the
"terrorist surveillance program" or "TSP" by Professor John C. Eastman.
The TSP was the program whereby the Bush Administration secretly
engaged in warrantless wiretapping for several years despite a statute-the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act [FISA]-mandating warrants.
Eastman deemed the TSP within the President's powers and not subject to
congressional restriction partly because "[o]ur nation's Founders created
... [an executive] strong enough to 'protect the community against foreign
attacks,' with 'secrecy' and 'dispatch' if necessary."37
Similar arguments were ventured in the late 1980s, inspired by
perceptions that Congress had over-reached in response to the Iran-Contra
Affair. A more indirect source of inspiration was the belief that Congress
had been unduly fettering the presidency since the 1970s in the wake of
Vietnam and Watergate. For example, Robert F. Turner invoked the
Vesting Clause thesis as partial explanation for his view that some of the
statutory restrictions at issue in Iran-Contra were unconstitutional
usurpations of executive power that could be legally circumvented. Turner
observed that foreign affairs powers traditionally belonged solely to the
executive because "legislative bodies were [deemed] 'incompetent' to
manage foreign affairs because they lacked the essential qualities of unity
of design, secrecy, and speed of dispatch. 38
The second major textual hook that supremacists invoke is the
commander-in-chief clause of Article II, which reads: "The President shall
be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.
39
Supremacists sometimes cite this clause alone and sometimes in tandem
with the Vesting Clause for the proposition that the President's judgment is
supreme as to which national security activities and secrecy measures are
necessary to further a wartime effort, to defend against future attacks, or
36. John C. Yoo, supra note 35, at 1984-85.
37. See Lawson, supra note 27, at 389-93; id. at 389-90 n.93 and accompanying text (citing
John C. Eastman, Listening to the Enemy: The President's Power to Conduct Surveillance of
Enemy Communications During Time of War, 13 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 49, 57 (2006)); see
also Eastman, supra this note, at 55-57 ("FISA.. may well be unconstitutional" if it restricts the
President's power of surveying "communications with enemies of the [U.S.] and people he
reasonably believes to be working with them").
38. Turner, supra note 29, at 92.
39. U.S. CONST. art. 11, §2, cl. 1.
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otherwise to protect the national security.4 ° Supremacists often deem it self-
evident that the commander-in-chief clause precludes Congress from
directing battlefield tactics-e.g., from telling the President, "take that hill."
They analogize from that example to other directives that they deem
unconstitutional.4 In defending the TSP, for example, the Department of
Justice argued in a public memorandum released shortly after the New York
Times revealed the program, that the TSP involved "tactical military
decisions" on a global "battlefield."42
As with the Vesting Clause thesis, supremacists who invoke the
commander-in-chief clause or make inferences from Article II as a whole
tend to draw from history. While some arguments are originalist in nature,
others use evolving history. In invoking the latter, supremacists argue that
the President's role has expanded and Congress' contracted throughout
American history, particularly with regard to national security. A long
history of presidential initiative and congressional acquiescence in a
particular area, they say, supports supremacy in that realm.43 They often
mix such historical points with reasoning conflating presidential capacities
and presidential prerogatives.
An example of influential supremacist reasoning that draws on these
various factors-founding era history, evolving history, and conflation of
capacity with legal right-is the well known report of a minority of
congresspersons (hereinafter "Minority Report") who dissented from the
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra
Affair in 1987. The Minority Report was joined by Senators James
40. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT, at 6-7, 29-35 (2006)
[hereinafter DOJ WHITEPAPER] (positing an exclusivist argument by reference to the Commander-
in-chief clause); YOO, supra note 22, at 103, 114, 119-22 (describing justifications for wartime
exclusivity grounded partly in the Commander-in-chief clause). Of course, the Commander-in-
chief argument is not exclusive of the Vesting Clause argument. See, e.g., From the Department of
Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration Interrogation Rules:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Judiciary
Comm., 110th Cong. 4 (2008) (written testimony of Michael Stokes Paulsen) (identifying large
realm of exclusivist presidential power regarding military and foreign affairs under the
commander-in-chief clause and executive power); Lawson, supra note 27, at 384 ("[A]lthough the
[DOJ WHITEPAPER] does not articulate the Vesting Clause thesis with clarity, it seems clear that
the Vesting Clause thesis lurks beneath the argument and provides it with substance."); YOO,
supra note 22, at 103 (combining Vesting Clause and commander-in-chief arguments); Eastman,
supra note 37, at 53 (underscoring supremacist argument by reference to commander-in-chief
clause, executive power, and the President's "inherent power as the organ of U.S. sovereignty on
the world stage.").
41. See Barron & Lederman I, supra note 19, at 694-95, 705, 750-52 (describing such
arguments). See also, e.g., Turner, supra note 29, at 118-19 (making such an argument).
42. DOJ WHITEPAPER, supra note 40, at 28-35.
43. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 1402-03 (discussing original and evolving history
arguments for exclusivity); Barron & Lederman 1, supra note 19, at 694-98 (citing under-
examined exclusivist assumptions about original and evolving history).
No. 1]
74 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. V
McClure and Orrin Hatch and by Representatives Dick Cheney, William S.
Broomfield, Henry J. Hyde, Jim Courter, Bill McCollum, and Michael
DeWine.4 Years later, as Vice President, Dick Cheney would point to the
Minority Report-written partly by David Addington, then a committee
staff member and later chief of staff to Vice President Cheney-as
embodying his views on presidential power.45 The Minority Report argues
that some of the statutory directives that President Reagan and his
subordinates were said to have violated in the Iran-Contra affair were
unconstitutional infringements that the President was free to ignore. The
Report cites the founding era premise that a single President would be
capable of "decision, activity, secrecy [and] dispatch," and would be
relatively accountable for his actions.46 From this, the Report draws a
constitutional presumption that activities that call for such capacities or that
involve case-by-case decision-making for which a single person can most
readily be held to account belong to the President alone.47 Among the
activities in this category are "the deployment and use of force (but not
declarations of war), together with negotiations, intelligence gathering, and
other diplomatic communications (but not treaty ratification). 48
The Minority Report argues that this founding design has been borne
out by actions of the political branches throughout history. The report cites
instances in which the President took unilateral action without seeking
congressional approval, including through covert operations, intelligence
gathering, uses of force, and actions taken pursuant to the President's
interpretation of treaties. The report deems it unsurprising that Presidents
have frequently asserted rights to act without congressional sanction. It
quotes Gary Schmitt's observation to the effect that such assertions follow
naturally from the President's structural capacities:
To some extent, the enumerated powers found in Article II are
deceiving in that they appear understated. By themselves, they do not
explain the particular primacy the presidency has had in the
governmental system since 1789. What helps to explain this fact is
the presidency's radically different institutional characteristics,
especially its unity of office. Because of its unique features, it
enjoys-as the Framers largely intended-the capacity of acting with
the greatest expedition, secrecy and effective knowledge. As a result,
when certain stresses, particularly in the area of foreign affairs, are
placed on the nation, it will "naturally" rise to the forefront.
49
44. See MINORITY REPORT, supra note 23.
45. See FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 154-55, 159-60, 200 (2007).
46. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 23, at 459-60.
47. Id. at 460; see also id. at 478.
48. Id. at 460.
49. Id. at 465-66.
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II. CATEGORIZING SUPREMACY CLAIMS INVOLVING
INFORMATION CONTROL
A. SUBSTANTIVE CLAIM TYPES
As noted, presidential supremacy takes a number of forms with respect
to information control. The most obvious respect in which supremacist
claims differ from one another is by the substantive nature of the claim.
That is, by the type of information that the executive seeks to protect or the
type of action that it seeks to justify, and/or by the underlying constitutional
rationale/s for the claim. This Article explores the following four
substantive claim categories and their relationship to transparency:
executive privilege; state secrets privilege; an exclusivist prerogative to
violate statutes in secret as the President deems necessary to protect
national security or the autonomy of his office; and a presidential
prerogative to effectively criminalize speech-without triggering the usual
strict judicial review required by the First Amendment-by deeming
information classified.
The first two claims are, in some contexts, simply more specific
versions of exclusivity-or assertions of a right to violate statutes. That is,
supremacists sometimes argue that a particular statute can constitutionally
be circumvented or should not be passed in the first place because it
violates the President's constitutional discretion to protect executive
privilege or state secrets. The first two claims can also be raised in forms
distinct from exclusivity, such as where the President objects to disclosing
information on executive privilege or state secrets grounds when the
disclosure is sought not as a matter of statutory right but of inherent judicial
power or a congressional committee's internal rules.
The fourth type of claim is somewhat different in nature from the first
three. While the executive branch at points has argued that Congress cannot
constitutionally interfere with its classification powers, the claim on which
this Article focuses is triggered where Congress has delegated power to the
executive branch. Specifically, it is triggered in cases where Congress has
criminalized certain speech based at least in part on its classified nature.
Supremacy comes into play when the executive responds to speakers' First
Amendment defenses. A typical response is that the executive's decision to
classify information effectively removes it from the purview of the First
Amendment. The supremacist argument, in short, is that the executive's
decision to classify speech essentially replaces-and thus precludes, or is
exclusive of-the rigorous inquiry in which the judiciary would otherwise
engage where speech is punished for its content.
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B. LEVELS OF RADICALISM
Another respect in which supremacist claims differ from one another is
by level of radicalism. Indeed, while I refer loosely to executive privilege,
state secrets, and classified speech claims as "supremacist," some
incarnations of these claims are so low in radicalism as to be non-
supremacist. We can thus start by differentiating between two broad
categories of claims. First, exclusivist claims are all sufficiently radical to
be considered supremacist. Still, the differences in radicalism levels among
exclusivist claims are worth examining. Second, non-exclusivist claims-
that is, those involving a privilege claim where the information request is
not based on a statute, and those involving classified speech-range from
those very high in radicalism to those so low in radicalism as to be non-
supremacist in nature.
1. Exclusivist Claims
To appreciate what makes a claim more or less radical, it is important to
understand the many layers in which information exists and can be
conveyed and protected throughout the constitutional system. As the earlier
discussion of dynamic vigilance suggests, the most basic mechanism for
government transparency is the general rule of macro-transparency. That is,
the rule that the laws that the President executes are themselves transparent
and result from a relatively public, deliberative legislative process. Thus,
even where the President has leeway to execute statutes in secret, and hence
to exercise micro-secrecy, the larger legal framework under which he
operates itself is transparent and subject to public reconsideration and
change.
The basic rule of macro-transparency is intertwined with, and requires
for its support, accountability tools to guard against secret statutory
circumvention and other instances of secrecy-cloaked abuse or
incompetence. For example, Congress may pass legislation that requires the
intelligence community to provide classified reports to specified members
of Congress. Congress may further, by statute or through internal chamber
rules, craft means to protect the information so transmitted-for example,
through internal ethics rules and staff security clearance requirements. It
may also provide outlets for broader publication should disclosures reveal
abuses-for example, through committee voting procedures to authorize
wider disclosures.
The most radical exclusivity claims are those that most threaten macro-
transparency. Claims of a right not only to circumvent statutes, but to do so
in secret for indefinite periods of time, are at the apex of radical exclusivity.
Through the TSP, for example, the Bush Administration secretly
circumvented existing statutory protections over the course of several years.
During this time, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice
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("the OLC") issued a classified, very closely held memorandum deeming
the TSP legal based on exclusivist reasoning. ° These actions were
extremely radical with respect to macro-transparency. They replaced
publicly determined and publicly known statutes with secret, and secretly
justified, executive branch law.
Somewhat less radical in nature are ex ante claims against passing
particular statutes in the first place on the basis of exclusivity. Such claims
are openly made and thus do not directly generate secret, executive-made
law. Nonetheless, they seek to avoid statutory limits on executive discretion
and thus to give the executive greater room to operate, quite possibly in
secret, without macro-transparent constraints. Such claims also may
implicitly or explicitly condone secret law by indicating that the executive
branch could circumvent particular proposed laws were they to pass. For
example, in the years after the TSP's existence was revealed by the New
York Times, Congress considered new legislation to govern electronic
surveillance. Ultimately, a Democratic Congress passed the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"). The FAA granted the Bush
Administration much of the wiretapping discretion that it had sought. 1 In a
fascinating exchange in one of the congressional hearings held to consider
legislation before the FAA's passage, an administration official urged the
Senate Judiciary Committee to grant the administration wide discretion to
avoid unconstitutionally constraining it. The official suggested that present
or future administrations might circumvent a more restrictive statute. He
said, "I believe that you'll ... see that if we have a scheme which is much
more-which we can use much more easily to protect the nation, there's
going to be even less need for this president or future presidents to go
outside of FISA.
52
A still less intrinsically radical claim is one that raises a case-specific
objection to a particular disclosure request, where the disclosure right was
created by statute. In this case, macro-transparency is not deeply threatened,
as the statute is neither circumvented in secret nor blocked from existing in
the first place. What is undermined, however, is the ability of the macro-
transparent legislative process to generate effective accountability tools.
50. See Office of the Inspector Gen. of the Dep't of Defense et al., Report No. 2009-0113-
AS, (U) Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program 10-12 (2009), available at
http:/ www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf.
51. Indeed, critics derided the FAA as essentially codifying the TSP. See, e.g., Patrick
Radden Keefe, Legislating in the Dark, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Nov. 1, 2008 at 26; Samantha
Fredrickson, Tapping into the Reporter's Notebook, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW, Fall 2008
at 11.
52. FISA Amendments: How to Protect Americans' Security and Privacy and Preserve the
Rule of Law and Government Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 16 (2007) (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Asst. Att'y Gen. for Nat'l Security,
U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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The radicalism of such a claim also depends on the scope of executive
discretion that it demands. For example, where a court reviews an
information-sharing dispute, a claim that the court must defer entirely to the
executive's view and should not even review the disputed information in
camera, is quite radical. Less radical is an argument that the court should
apply a presumption in the executive's favor but must ultimately make the
call by independently reviewing the disputed information and weighing the
costs and benefits of disclosure.
Not all exclusivist claims thus are equally radical. Nonetheless, all
threaten macro-transparency by challenging the efficacy or very creation of
macro-transparent, statutory restrictions and accountability tools. As such,
all are sufficiently radical as to be considered supremacist in nature.
2. Other Claim Types
There is more radicalism variation among claims that raise case-specific
objections to particular disclosure requests, where the disclosure rights were
not created by statute but stem from internal congressional chamber rules or
inherent judicial power. In such cases, the various costs and benefits of
disclosure were not already assessed through the macro-transparent
legislative process. There thus is room for debate, whether with members of
Congress or with a court and opposing counsel, over the merits of a
particular disclosure. While macro-transparency is not directly affected in
such a case, accountability tools-such as independent judicial review and
congressional oversight-can be very much at stake depending on the level
of executive discretion sought. In such cases the degree of radicalism
ultimately hinges on the scope of the secrecy right asserted and the extent to
which the executive claims discretion to determine the same.
Similarly, claims involving "classified speech" and the First
Amendment can range from high to fairly low in radicalism, depending on
the nature of the claim. Such claims do not directly challenge macro-
transparency as they arise in cases involving statutes that criminalize certain
speech. Yet they do threaten a crucial accountability tool that supports
macro-transparency. Classified information leaks by government
employees-ranging from civil service personnel to the White House inner
circle-are the lifeblood of journalism. And leaks by government
employees to journalists about secret statutory violations have at times been
the only means through which the public and members of Congress
eventually learned of such activities. The radicalism of a particular claim
thus varies by the extent to which it seeks to diminish the judicial scrutiny
that would ordinarily apply to criminal punishments of speech if the speech
were not deemed classified. At one end of the spectrum is the very radical
claim that anyone who disseminates classified information-whether a
government employee or The New York Times reporting on a secret
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government program---can be criminally punished consistent with the First
Amendment. Less radical are claims that do not deem First Amendment
concerns fully vitiated by classification status, but that call for some lesser
level of judicial scrutiny than would apply in the context of non-classified
speech. Less radical claims may also allow for other fact-specific elements
to be taken into account, such as whether the speech at issue was leaked by
a government employee or disseminated by the press.
Of course, there is no exact science to separating supremacist claims
from non-supremacist claims in the realms of executive privilege, state
secrets privilege, and classified speech. Roughly speaking, however, the
higher the level of radicalism-that is, the more deference demanded by the
executive to its judgment-the more likely the claim is to be supremacist in
nature.
III. SUPREMACY AND TRANSPARENCY
A. A WORD ON HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY
As the examples that follow reflect, supremacist claims-again, using
the term somewhat loosely to encompass all exclusivist, executive
privilege, state secrets, and classified speech claims-have grown
increasingly radical, ubiquitous, and influential over time. This conclusion
is in keeping with other fimdings. For example, national security based
exclusivity overall is of surprisingly recent vintage. In two recent articles,
Professors David Barron and Martin Lederman challenge the exclusivist
premise that legislative directions to the President on the battlefield were
always understood to be unconstitutional. As noted earlier, exclusivists
often invoke this premise as a given. From there, they analogize particular
statutory mandates to battlefield instructions to deem the latter
unconstitutional. Barron and Lederman demonstrate that in fact, Congress
has long passed legislation constraining the President's conduct of military
campaigns from the Founding Era through the present. 3 Barron and
Lederman also show that presidents almost never explicitly claimed that
such constraints were unconstitutional prior to the mid-twentieth century."
Similarly, I have demonstrated elsewhere the relative novelty of exclusivist
arguments to the effect that Congress is constitutionally limited in its power
53. Barron & Lederman 1, supra note 19, at 693, 696-97, 704-15; Barron & Lederman 11,
supra note 19, at 947-48, 951-52, 996-97, 1009-15, 1027, 1058-59; cf Barron & Lederman 1,
supra note 19, at 772-86 (noting that actions of the Continental Congress during the
Revolutionary War and texts of post-revolution state constitutions reflected the understanding that
legislatures could direct details of military campaigns waged by the "commanders in chief").
54. Barron & Lederman 1, supra note 19, at 697, 718-20, 763-64; Barron & Lederman 11,
supra note 19, at 948-49, 952,993-94, 999-1004, 1007-09, 1015-16, 1027, 1034-35, 1057-58.
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to restrict wiretapping.
The historical trajectory is important partly because exclusivists invoke
history on their behalves. Yet in so doing, they sometimes leap from low-
radicalism claims of the distant past to more radical contemporary
arguments. In the process, they often jump as well from capacity to legal
right. Thus, for example, because of the executive's "first-mover"
advantage-that is, its structural capacity to simply act absent some
affirmative action by another branch-it has managed at times to take
actions openly grounded in highly questionable statutory interpretations.56
To an exclusivist, such action may, decades later, constitute precedent
favoring a constitutional right to secretly circumvent statutes. 7 Similarly,
founding-era boasts of the President's capacity to keep secrets are, centuries
later, invoked as precedent for broad executive discretion to override
statutory openness requirements. 8
B. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
The earliest executive privilege claims in post-founding America were
discrete, fact-specific objections to information requests by Congress and,
less frequently, by the courts. The case-by-case nature of early claims is
evidenced partly by the absence of a standard label for them until 1958,
when the Eisenhower Administration coined the term "executive
privilege. '59 For clarity's sake, I use that label to refer to all such claims,
including those made before 1958. The first executive privilege dispute in
American history occurred when a congressional committee sought papers
from the Washington Administration regarding a failed military expedition
led by General St. Clair. According to the memoirs of Thomas Jefferson-
then Washington's Secretary of State-Washington and his cabinet were of
the view that the President should withhold papers that might damage the
public interest. Yet as the memoirs and subsequent events reflect, the
cabinet decided that the release of the St. Clair papers would not be
damaging. Washington thus complied with the congressional committee's
request.6' Washington took a similarly fact-tailored approach in the next
55. Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 1421-33.
56. See Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 1414 n. 84 (citing Neal Devins, Presidential
Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today's Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to
Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 395, 399 (2009); Terry M. Moe & William
G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850,
855-56 (1999); William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands
and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 518 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive
Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2677 (2005)).
57. See e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 19, at 1406-11.
58. See, e.g., MINORITY REPORT, supra note 23, at 459-60.
59. MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 39 (2d ed., rev., Univ. Press of Kan. 2002).
60. Id. at 29-30; Saikrishna B. Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of
Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1177-79 (1999); Archibald Cox, Executive
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two information sharing disputes of his administration. In the second
dispute, the Senate sought correspondence involving Gouverneur Morris,
U.S. Ambassador. Washington transmitted portions of the requested
documents, explaining to the Senate:
After an examination of [the correspondence], I directed copies and
translations to be made; except in those particulars, in my judgment,
for public considerations, ought not to be communicated. These
copies and translations are now transmitted to the Senate; but the
nature of them manifest the propriety of their being received as
confidential.6
In the third and final dispute of President Washington's administration, the
House of Representatives sought the instructions that the President had
given to Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate a treaty with Britain.
Washington refused the request on the ground that the House had no
constitutional role in the treaty process-treaties are negotiated by the
President and subject to supermajority approval by the Senate. Washington
explained that disclosing negotiations, even after their completion, would
fly in the face of the secrecy concerns that led the Founders to delegate
treaty consideration to the President and the Senate alone. Washington
stressed that he had provided the Senate with all papers relevant to
approving the treaty.62 The House, which had sought the papers to help
decide whether to appropriate funding to implement the treaty, passed two
non-binding resolutions in response to Washington's refusal. The first
affirmed the House's constitutional role in passing legislation necessary to
implement treaties. The second "insisted that the House need never declare
the purposes or application of the information, so long as the information
related to 'Constitutional functions of the House."' 63
It is disputable whether these early claims can be considered
supremacist. Washington did not assert a preclusive legal right-as opposed
to policy judgments subject to negotiation or even statutory directive-to
withhold information from a body with a constitutional interest in receiving
it.' Nor did the requesting bodies in the first two cases indicate that they
thought the President possessed such a right. The congressional committee
investigating the St. Clair expedition had nothing to contest, as Washington
turned over all requested papers. In the dispute involving Gouverneur
Morris, the Senate did not object to Washington's redactions, but this
silence could have meant many things. As Saikrishna Prakash points out,
Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1391-92 (1974); William P. Rogers, The Papers of the
Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A. J. 941, 943-44 (1958).
61. ROZELL, supra note 59, at 30; see also id. at 30-31; Prakash, supra note 60, at 1179-80.
62. ROZELL, supra note 59, at 31; Prakash, supra note 60, at 1181-83.
63. Prakash, supra note 60, at 1183-84.
64. Id. at 1184.
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"the Senate's unwillingness to challenge Washington's deletions may have
reflected nothing more than a changed political calculus.
[Alternatively,] it is entirely possible that the Senate found the furnished
materials sufficient for the Senate's needs."65 In the third case, in which
Washington refused to give documents to the House about John Jay's
negotiations with Britain, the House made clear its view that it had a right
to the same. These early controversies thus do not necessarily stand for
more than the notion that the executive can raise policy objections to inter-
branch information requests, and that those objections are subject to
responses by the requesting parties.
If one does label those early claims supremacist, they are quite low in
radicalism. For one thing, each claim was made and explained openly.
Furthermore, each was defended in a fact-specific manner. To the extent
that President Washington viewed his responses as legal claims, they were
legal claims contingent on facts and hence conducive to debate and
negotiation. This is distinct from legal claims that seek effectively to
preclude debate by cloaking their justifications in secrecy or asserting a
legal discretion so sweeping as to elide fact-specific objections.
The seeds of more radical executive privilege claims began to be
planted around the mid-1 9 th century, becoming relatively standard by about
the mid-20th century.66 Claims are now typically framed as matters of
constitutional right, with the right extrapolated from the President's
capacity to keep secrets. Such extrapolation often takes the form of
historical argument. For example, executive privilege proponents infer a
constitutional right to keep secrets from post-founding examples of
presidential secret-keeping, including the Washington Administration
examples discussed above.6" They also infer such a right from founding era
statements that celebrate the President's secret-keeping capacity,
particularly from two Federalist Paper passages: Federalist 70, in which
Alexander Hamilton supports a unitary President because "'[d]ecision,
activity, secrecy and despatch [sic] will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any great number"' and Federalist 64, in which John Jay
champions the relative "'secrecy... and "'despatch [sic]"' of the executive
branch as an advantage in treaty-making.6 8
Modem claims are also much broader than the case-specific objections
65. Id. at 1180; see also Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Privilege: An Historical Note, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 1318, 1321 (1975).
66. See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 59, at 32-39 (describing executive privilege claims in the
Adams to Eisenhower administrations); Cox, supra note 60, 1395-1405 (discussing executive
privilege claims from the Washington through Truman administrations).
67. See, e.g., ROZELL, supra note 59, at 28-32 (supporting a qualified executive privilege
based partly on this history).
68. See, e.g., id. at 24-25 (citing these passages in support of a qualified executive privilege).
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of the Washington Administration. For example, the Eisenhower
administration expressed the view that "the President and the heads of
departments have an uncontrolled discretion to withhold . . . information
and papers in the public interest."69 President Eisenhower also "was the first
to claim explicitly an executive privilege based simply on an
undifferentiated interest in preserving the confidentiality of deliberations
and advice throughout the Executive Branch."7 The latter claim is
generally framed as the "candor" rationale-that is, the notion that the
President may shield high level executive branch communications when he
determines that disclosing the same could inhibit candor in future
communications." An early invocation of the claim by the Obama
Administration demonstrates its long reach. In the wake of a controversy
over security procedures for the White House state dinner, the
Administration explained that the White House social secretary is immune
from testifying before Congress "[b]ased on the separation of powers" and
the need for "the White House staff to provide advice to the [P]resident
confidentially." 2
Modern, relatively radical claims tend to have substantial shadow
effects in light of their far-reaching rationales. By "shadow effect," I mean
the effect that a doctrine has even when it is not invoked formally in a
particular case.73 A shadow effect of executive privilege, for example, is the
fact that congresspersons may forgo seeking information in the first place,
or may give up after an initial refusal, because they suspect that their
continued insistence will result in nothing more than a years-long court
battle. Consider the impact, for example, of the Supreme Court's 1974
decision in United States v. Nixon. 4 Nixon arose from Richard Nixon's
refusal to turn over tapes of oval office conversations subpoenaed in the
Watergate prosecutions.75 While rejecting President Nixon's claim of
privilege under the extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Court for
the first time recognized executive privilege as a valid constitutional
doctrine. Citing the candor rationale, the Court deemed the privilege a
presumptive one in favor of the President. 6 The Court also suggested that
69. Text of Eisenhower Letter and Brownell Memorandum on Testimony in Senate Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1954, at 24.
70. Cox, supra note 60, at 1433.
71. See, e.g., Gia B. Lee, The President's Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 197, 198-202,
205-13 (2008).
72. Michael D. Shear, Government Openness is Tested by Salahi Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 4,
2009, at C7.
73. Cf generally, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2010), ssrn draft, http://ssrn.conabstract-1566982 (describing the shadow effect of
state secrets).
74. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
75. Id. at 686-90.
76. Id. at 705-09.
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where the claim rests on a different rationale-that of national security-the
presumption is even stronger, requiring extreme if not absolute judicial
deference." Since the Nixon case, the candor and national security
rationales have been invoked countless times-both generally and as
explicit claims of executive privilege-by executive branch officials as
bases to avoid testifying to Congress or the courts or disclosing information
under public access statutes. The ubiquity of such demurrals, in turn, can
discourage congresspersons from pursuing inquiries in light of their
possible futility or can provide a desired escape hatch for those who prefer
not to probe the executive branch for partisan or other reasons.78
The most radical executive privilege claims are exclusivist in nature-
that is, they embrace a right to circumvent statutes that impose disclosure
requirements. Before considering examples of such claims, it is helpful to
understand the different ways in which exclusivist objections to statutes can
manifest themselves. The most obvious form of such an objection is an
explicit claim to the effect that a statute is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied from an exclusivist perspective. Yet exclusivity can also manifest
itself through aggressive statutory interpretation. That is, through strained
statutory readings that lead to the conclusion that particular presidential
actions are permitted by statute. Two marks of an exclusivity-infused
statutory reading are: (1) the tenuousness of the statutory interpretation and
(2) the linking of the interpretation to a broad view of the President's power
under Article II. The link can take one of two forms. It can take the form of
an argument that a statute authorizing presidential power is most naturally
read broadly given the breadth of the President's constitutional discretion to
execute laws. Or it can amount to the position that the statute must be read
very broadly if reasonably possible because a more constraining statute
would violate the President's constitutional powers or would raise a serious
question to that effect.
An important example of an exclusivity-infused statutory interpretation
involving executive privilege arose in the midst of the Iran-Contra
controversy. In 1986, the OLC was asked to offer an opinion on the legality
of the decision previously made and implemented by President Reagan to
withhold notice to the congressional intelligence committees of the decision
to sell arms to Iran until roughly ten months after the deal was complete.
79
The statutory requirement at issue was Section 501 of the National Security
77. ldat 710-11.
78. See, e.g., EMILY BERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A
LEGISLATIVE REMEDY, 2-4, 7-13, 16-23 (2009); Lee, supra note 71, at 198-99, 209-13; Heidi
Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489,
496-501 (2007).
79. President's Compliance with the "Timely Notification" Requirement of Section 501(B)
of the National Security Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 159 (1986) [hereinafter "Timely Notification"
Memo].
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Act. For any covert actions about which the intelligence committees were
not given prior notice, the Act required the President to inform them "in a
timely fashion" and to provide a "statement of the reasons for not giving
prior notice."8 The OLC concluded that the word "timely" had to be
interpreted to give the President "virtually unfettered" discretion to
withhold notice for however long he deemed necessary. Otherwise, the act
would raise serious constitutional questions.8" Among other things, the OLC
cited U.S. v. Nixon, explaining that while the Nixon Court rejected President
Nixon's:
sweeping and undifferentiated claim of executive privilege as
applied to communications involving domestic affairs, the Court
repeatedly and emphatically stressed that military or diplomatic
secrets are in a different category: such secrets are intimately linked
to the President's Article I duties, where the "courts have
traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential
responsibilities."s"
Another indirect use of executive privilege to avoid a statutory
disclosure requirement can occur when an administration warns that
executive privilege concerns might be raised if statutory disclosure rights
are pursued. This technique proved successful in the 2004 case of Cheney v.
U.S. District Court.83 The Cheney Court admonished lower courts that the
Vice President need not invoke executive privilege in order to seek court
protection from disclosing information under an openness law. Instead, the
Court explained, it was enough for the Vice President to object to an entire
discovery request on separation of powers grounds, including the ground
that it would unduly burden him to have to claim executive privilege with
respect to particular pieces of information.84 Hence, the very possibility that
executive privilege problems might be raised by aspects of a discovery
order was enough to get the order struck (and ultimately, on remand, to
have the case dismissed) although executive privilege was never claimed.85
Administrations also invoke executive privilege directly to object to
proposed legislation and thus to keep macro-transparent disclosure
obligations from arising in the first place. For example, the Obama
Administration objected to proposed legislation to require notice to the
congressional intelligence committees in cases where administrations
currently may notify a smaller group known as the "Gang of Eight."86 The
80. 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (1988) (repealed 1991).
81. "Timely Notification" Memo, supra note 79, at 173-74.
82. Id. at 165 (emphasis omitted).
83. 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
84. Id. at 375, 388-90.
85. See In re Richard B. Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 725, 727, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing
separation of powers issues, ordering case dismissed on remand).
86. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2701-
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Administration deemed the proposal to "raise significant executive
privilege concerns by purporting to require the disclosure of internal
Executive branch legal advice and deliberations." It also cited "the
President's responsibility to protect sensitive national security
information."87 The administration also threatened to veto an amended
proposal, written in response to its initial objection, to allow Gang of Eight
notice while requiring some general information-including the fact that
more detailed notice was given to the Gang of Eight-to be provided to the
full intelligence committees.88
C. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
There is some uncertainty as to where executive privilege ends and the
state secrets privilege begins. Indeed, Professors Robert M. Pallitto and
William G. Weaver argue in their book, Presidential Secrecy and the Law,
that commentators are mistaken to perceive a national security branch of
executive privilege doctrine at all. To the contrary, they argue that national
security secrecy claims are all state secrets claims. From this perspective,
the Nixon Court's distinction between privilege claims based on the candor
rationale and those based on "military or diplomatic secrets" is not a
distinction between types of executive privilege claims, but between
executive privilege on the one hand and state secrets on the other. Pallitto
and Weaver deem this point highly consequential, perhaps most importantly
because they explain that only executive privilege is constitutionally based,
which limits Congress' ability to curtail it, whereas the state secrets
privilege is a product of the common law that Congress may freely
override.89
It is true that the case law leaves some uncertainty as to the overlap, if
any, between executive privilege and state secrets doctrines. It is also true
that there is debate over whether the state secrets privilege is solely a
common law privilege or whether it is grounded partly or fully in Article II
of the Constitution.9" Relatedly, there is debate over Congress' ability to
foreclose the state secrets privilege. 9' This discussion proceeds, however, on
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 (July 8, 2009) [hereinafter POLICY
STATEMENT ON INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010]; see also, e.g.,
Scott Shane, CIA Reviewing its Process for Briefing Congress, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2009, at A16.
87. POLICY STATEMENT ON INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010,
supra note 86.
88. See Letter from Peter R. Orszag to Sen. Diane Feinstein (Mar. 15, 2010); see also, e.g.,
Walter Pincus, White House Threatens Veto on Intelligence Activities Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 16,
2010, at A4.
89. ROBERT M. PALLITrO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW
98-99, 105, 117-19, 206 (2007).
90. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1270-71, 1293-95 (2007).
91. Id. at 1309-10; Neil Kinkopf, The State Secrets Problem: Can Congress Fix It?, 80
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the conventional assumption that there is some overlap between the two
privileges as well as some applications unique to each privilege. This
assumption entails four main points. First, national-security-based executive
privilege claims made in response to congressional requests for information
do not overlap with state secrets claims, as the latter appear to be treated
only as evidentiary privileges in litigation disputes. Second, state secrets
claims that do not involve high-level executive branch communications-
such as discussions with the President--do not overlap with executive
privilege claims. Third, there is some potential for overlap between state
secrets and executive privilege where a national-security-based secrecy
claim is made in response to a litigation-driven request for information
involving presidential or other high-level executive branch
communications. If the Nixon Court indeed was referring to a national
security branch of executive privilege, this scenario presumably was what it
had in mind. Fourth, any questions as to the constitutional grounding of
some or all state secrets claims need not depend on the claims'
nomenclature. Hence, while this Article treats state secrets doctrine as
encompassing all litigation-based national security secrecy claims and as
overlapping in part with executive privilege claims, these assumptions
hardly resolve the claims' constitutional status.
The state secrets privilege enables the government to argue to a court
that it would endanger national security to reveal certain evidence in open
court or even in a closed setting to the court alone.92 Given the doctrine's
somewhat disputed basis and origins-with some arguing that it developed
solely as a common law privilege with no constitutional content, and others
treating it as a supremacist doctrine with roots in both the common law and
constitutional law 93-it is not surprising that the Supreme Court's seminal
state secrets case bears elements of both low-level and high-level
radicalism. The case, 1953's United States v. Reynolds,94 marked the
Court's first explicit recognition of the doctrine.95
Reynolds stemmed from lawsuits brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA") by the widows of three civilian observers on a B-29
aircraft that crashed during a test flight. The widows claimed that the crash
was caused by Air Force negligence. 96 They sought the production of the
Air Force's official accident report.97 The Air Force sought to quash the
TEMP. L. REv. 489, 494, 497-98 (2007).
92. See Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1931, 1935-37 (2007).
93. Donohue, supra note 73, ssm draft at 4-5, 5 n. 15.
94. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
95. Donohue, supra note 73, ssm draft at 4.
96. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 1-2; see also LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF
NATIONAL SECURITY 3, 29 (2006).
97. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
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request, claiming a constitutional privilege to protect state secrets.98 The Air
Force explained that the plane had carried "'confidential equipment on
board and any disclosure of its mission or information concerning its
operation or performance would be prejudicial to [the Air Force] and would
not be in the public interest."' 99 The widows argued that Congress had
overridden any privilege by passing the FTCA and that it was within
Congress' constitutional power to do so.' The Supreme Court concluded
that it need not weigh in on either side of the constitutional issue. Instead, it
read the FTCA to incorporate the state secrets privilege.'' The Court thus
explored the privilege's content but did not address whether it was
constitutionally based and whether Congress could override it.
The Reynolds Court outlined "principles which control the application
of the privilege":
The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it;
it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to
be lightly invoked. There must be formal claim of privilege, lodged
by the head of the department which has control over the matter,
after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself
must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the
claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.'02
The Court added that "[t]he latter requirement is the only one which
presents real difficulty."'0 3 With respect to that requirement, the Court
cautioned the judiciary not to abdicate their judgment over evidentiary
matters "to the caprice of executive officers."' 4 This point was coupled
with the Court's earlier warning to the executive branch not to invoke the
privilege lightly. Yet the Court declined to:
go so far as to say that the court may automatically require a
complete disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will
be accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy the court, from
all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which,
in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When
this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the
court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant
98. Id. at 3-4, 6; see also FISHER, supra note 96, at 96-99.
99. FISHER, supra note 96, at 53 (quoting statement of Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K.
Finletter, filed October 10, 1950, Civil Action No. 10142 (E.D. Pa. 1950)); see also Reynolds, 345
U.S. at 4-5.
100. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6; see also FISHER, supra note 96, at 102.
101. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6-7.
102. Id. at 7-8.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 9-10.
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to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by
the judge alone, in chambers." 5
The Court also suggested that judicial assessments as to whether disclosure
would create a "reasonable danger" should be weighed against the strength
of the interests in disclosure. However, "even the most compelling
necessity [for disclosure] cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake."' 10 6
The Reynolds Court deemed the widows' need for the accident report
"dubious" because the widows could have, but did not, interview the
surviving crew members." 7 The Court thus concluded that "a formal claim
of privilege, made under the circumstances of this case, will have to
prevail" based on the government's affidavits. The Court did not look
beyond the affidavits to review the accident report itself. The Court
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with
its decision.'0 8
On the one hand, aspects of the Reynolds opinion lay the foundation for
a privilege low in radicalism. The Court left open the possibility that the
privilege was not constitutional in nature. Of equal importance, it stated that
the judiciary must independently determine whether and how the privilege
applies in any given case, as "' [i]t is the judge who is in control of the trial,
not the executive.""0 9 Yet in applying the privilege, the Court planted the
seeds of a far more radical doctrine by refusing to require in camera judicial
review of the evidence at issue. As one commentator explained in reflecting
on Reynolds, "if the court does not examine the information, it must decide
in the dark. Thus, the executive will almost always determine the legal
question of privilege."'"1
0
The risk of executive abuse when judges do not independently examine
evidence is sharply illuminated by the factual developments that followed
Reynolds. As noted, the Reynolds Court remanded the case back to the
lower courts. At that point, the widows' attorney noticed depositions of the
surviving crew members. The attorney subsequently wrote to one of the
widows that "'we went ahead and took the depositions' and that the crew
members stated that the secret equipment that the government claimed
would be revealed in the accident report "'had absolutely nothing to do with
the accident and had not even been put into operation.""" According to the
widows' recollections, the attorney at that point "seemed inclined to take
105. Id. at 10.
106. Id. at ll .
107. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
108. Id. at 11-12.
109. Id. at 8 n.21 (internal citation omitted).
110. James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875, 891 (1966).
111. FISHER, supra note 96, at 116.
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the issue back to district court, using the depositions as evidence that access
to the accident report was needed.""' However, the widows decided against
a further round of litigation. The advice of one widow's family lawyer
might have played a role. He wrote to her of his
'doubts now, as we are deprived of most essential proof to make out
a case.' The accident report 'was of official character and carries in
it the determinable cause of the failure in the plane which
precipitated the tragedy.' Statements by surviving crew members
'might and might not spell out negligence sufficient to base a
judgment in your favor thereon; but inasmuch as these are all that is
left to us to proceed on, [the plaintiffs' attorney] will have to make
the best of them on the trial."' 3
The widows agreed to settle with the government rather than continue to
trial.' 1
4
Nearly fifty years later, the daughter of one of the deceased civilian
observers obtained the accident report, which by then was declassified, after
learning on the internet that it was available." 5 She discovered that the
report contained no military secrets about experimental equipment or
otherwise. "But there was incriminating evidence showing government
negligence. According to the report, the crash was most likely caused by an
engine fire. Contrary to Air Force directives, a protective shield designed to
prevent engine overheating had not been installed.""' 6
Reynolds' impact has been substantial, with the decision's high-
radicalism potential increasingly realized. For one thing, many lower courts
have upheld privilege claims based solely on government affidavits or
declarations, without themselves reviewing the disputed materials." 7
Indeed, courts at times have upheld claims based solely on government
declarations even when the disputed information had once been in the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 117.
115. Id. at 167.
116. Timothy Lynch, An Injustice Wrapped in a Pretense, WASH. POST, June 22, 2003, at B3;
see also FISHER, supra note 96, at 167-68; Warren Richey, Security or Coverup?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 8, 2006, at USA, p. 1.
117. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 89, at 107; Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role
that Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 167-68
(2006); Kinkopf, supra note 91, at 490; Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege:
Expanding its Scope Through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 107-08, 119
(2007); Restoring the Rule of Law: Hearing Before the Constitution Subcomm. of the S. Judiciary
Comm., 1 10th Cong. 14 (2008) (written testimony of Amanda Frost and Justin Florence on
reforming the state secrets privilege) [hereinafter Frost and Florence testimony]; Examining the
State Secrets Privilege: Protecting National Security While Preserving Accountability: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Congress 2-3 (2008) (written testimony of Louis
Fisher); CONSTITUTION PROJECT, REFORMING THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 3-7 (2007),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/52.pdf.
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public domain and was retroactively classified after the plaintiffs lawsuit
was filed."' Courts have also upheld claims based on government
declarations that invoke the theoretically limitless "mosaic theory.""' 9 The
mosaic theory encompasses "the notion that the government may withhold
otherwise trivial or innocuous information because it might prove
dangerous if combined with other information by a knowledgeable actor
(especially a hostile intelligence agency)."' 2°
More so, state secrets doctrine has been used as a basis not only to
exclude certain pieces of evidence, but to dismiss entire cases because the
very subject matter of the litigation is deemed a state secret or because the
plaintiff is deemed unable to make their case without disclosing state
secrets. Research by Professor Robert Chesney reveals that the government,
as reflected in published cases, requested dismissal on state secrets grounds
five times between 1971 and 1980 (with three of the five requests granted),
nine times between 1981 and 1990 (with eight of the nine requests granted),
thirteen times between 1991 and 2000 (with twelve of the thirteen requests
granted), and sixteen times between 2001 and 2006 (with ten of the sixteen
requests granted). 121
As noted, assertions of the privilege and judicial applications of the
same are often underscored by supremacist reasoning. For example, both
the Bush and Obama Administrations sought the dismissal of entire cases
under the privilege. Each took the position that the privilege, while
developed at common law, "has a firm foundation in the constitutional
authority of the President under Article II to protect national security
information.' ' 2
Supremacist invocations of the state secrets privilege tend to conflate
presidential capacity with presidential prerogative. For example, courts
applying the state secrets privilege first and most ubiquitously reason that
the executive branch, by virtue of the fact that it has access to so many
secrets and that it often plays a predominant role in national security
matters, has an expertise that courts cannot safely second-guess. As
Professor Amanda Frost and attorney Justin Florence explain, "[j]udges
118. See Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F.Supp. 2d 65, 76-77 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd,
161 Fed.Appx. 6, 2005 WL 3696301 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also David Vladeck, Litigating
National Security Cases in the Aftermath of 9/11, 2 J. NAT'L. SEC. L. & POL'Y. 165, 167-71, 186-
92 (2006) (discussing Edmonds case)).
119. PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 89, at 110-12.
120. Christina Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 845, 846 (2006); see also David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and
the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630-31 (2005).
121. Chesney, supra note 90, at 1307.
122. Government Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss and for Summary
Judgment at 12 n.9, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009) (No.
C:08-cv-4373-VRW) [hereinafter Jewel MTD]. See also infra notes 135-137and accompanying
text.
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repeatedly assert that they must defer to the executive because they lack the
ability to make independent judgments about the executive's claimed need
for the privilege, and frankly concede that they are reluctant [to] second-
guess the executive's assertions that disclosure will put the nation at
risk.' 1 23 Second, the expertise rationale is sometimes explicitly intertwined
with the more straightforward notion that national security secrecy
decisions belong to the executive branch as a matter of constitutional right.
The opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in El
Masri v. United States exemplifies both lines of reasoning.2 4 In El Masri,
the court dismissed a case brought by a German citizen of Lebanese descent
who claimed that the CIA mistakenly identified him as a terrorist, captured
him, tortured him and sent him to Afghanistan where he was jailed for four
months before being released on the side of an abandoned road in Albania
months after the CIA had discovered his innocence.'25 The court relied on
declarations by the CIA Director to dismiss the case on state secrets
grounds.2 6 Describing the constitutional backdrop against which it made its
decision, the Fourth Circuit, echoing similar reasoning by the District Court
whose opinion it affirmed, explained that "the Executive's constitutional
authority is at its broadest in the realm of military and foreign affairs. The
[Supreme] Court accordingly has indicated that the judiciary's role as a
check on presidential action in foreign affairs is limited."'27 The Fourth
Circuit cited, among other things, to Supreme Court precedent that
prescribed a "limited judicial role in foreign policy matters, especially those
involving 'information properly held secret"" 28 and that deemed the
"'authority to protect [national security] information''' to belong to "the
President as head of the Executive Branch and as commander-in-chief." 29
The El Masri Court joined its pure constitutional rationale to analysis
based on executive expertise. It invoked the mosaic theory and the
President's unique vantage point to determine when disclosures will cause
international embarrassment or otherwise harm foreign relations:
[D]eference is appropriate not only for constitutional reasons, but
also practical ones: the Executive and the intelligence agencies
under his control occupy a position superior to that of the courts in
evaluating the consequences of a release of sensitive information. In
the related context of confidential classification decisions, we have
123. Frost and Florence testimony, supra note 117, at 14.
124. El Masri v. Tenet (El Masri 11), 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
125. El Masri v. Tenet (El Masri 1), 437 F.Supp.2d 530, 532-34 (E.D. Va. 2006); Complaint
1-3, 15, 27-54, El Masri 1, 437 F.Supp.2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No. 1:05cv1417).
126. El Masri 1, 479 F.3d 296 at 301, 311.
127. Id. at 303.
128. Id. at 303-04 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948)).
129. Id. at 304 (quoting Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)).
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observed that "[t]he courts, of course, are ill-equipped to become
sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve
effectively in the revi6w of secrecy classifications in that area."
(citation omitted) The executive branch's expertise in predicting the
potential consequences of intelligence disclosures is particularly
important given the sophisticated nature of modem intelligence
analysis, in which "[t]he significance of one item of information
may frequently depend upon knowledge of many other items of
information," and "[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may
appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene
and may put the questioned item of information in its proper
context." Id. In the same vein, in those situations where the state
secrets privilege has been invoked because disclosure risks
impairing our foreign relations, the President's assessment of the
diplomatic situation is entitled to great weight.130
The state secrets privilege casts a very long shadow. As Laura Donohue
notes, the impact of the privilege goes far deeper than its appearance in
published judicial opinions can tell us. Donohue searched court dockets to
examine the use of the privilege in litigation, and thus to assess how it
influences cases including those that do not result in published opinions or
in which the privilege is not mentioned in those opinions. Donohue found:
[F]rom January 2001 through January 2009 the privilege played a
significant role in the Executive Branch's national security litigation
strategy. In one case, the Administration asserted state secrets some
245 times. More to the point, in more than one hundred cases the
government invoked state secrets. . . . And it is not just the
Executive Branch that benefited from the privilege: in scores of
additional cases private industry asserted state secrets with the
expectation that the federal government would later step in to
prevent certain documents from being subject to discovery or to
stop the suit from moving forward. Beyond these, there are
hundreds of cases on which the shadow of the privilege fell.13 '
Donohue finds the shadow effect to be of great practical consequence.
For instance, she notes that in cases against private government contractors,
"[e]ven where the government never becomes involved in the suit, the
threat of state secrets gives the companies a tactical advantage. It shapes
litigation in important and prejudicial ways, often dropping out of the
picture by the time the court issues its opinion resolving the case." 3 2 In
suits against the government, "the mere assertion that state secrets are or
130. Id. at 305.
131. Donohue, supra note 73, ssrn draft at 7-8.
132. Id. at 15.
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may be at stake tips the scale toward the government."' 33 The case files, she
concludes, "strongly suggest that the shadow of state secrets is much longer
than previously realized-indeed, that state secrets doctrine has expanded
well beyond the framing of Reynolds, to become a powerful litigation tool
for both private and public actors."' 34
Finally, exclusivist state secrets claims have been made to argue that
Congress may not constitutionally limit the doctrine. In an April 2009 brief
urging dismissal of a case against the National Security Agency on state
secrets grounds, for instance, the Obama Administration "incorporate[d] by
reference [the government's] prior detailed discussion" to the effect that the
statute under which the plaintiffs brought suit should not be read to preempt
the state secrets privilege.'35 The referenced prior argument was made in
two Bush Administration briefs in a related case. 36 There, the government
had argued, among other things, that a preemptive reading of the statute
should be avoided because
any effort by Congress to regulate an exercise of the Executive's
authority to protect national security through the state secrets
privilege would plainly raise serious constitutional concerns, and it
is well-established that courts should construe statutory law to avoid
serious constitutional problems unless such construction is 'plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress." 37
The Bush Administration also objected, on exclusivist and other
grounds, to legislation that Congress considered in 2008 to place limits on
the doctrine. 3 s While the Obama Administration has not, as of this writing,
spoken directly to that legislation-the State Secrets Protection Act, which
was introduced in 2008 and again in 2009-its exclusivist response to the
claim that another statute preempts the state secrets privilege could
obviously be applied to such legislation. Furthermore, while the Obama
Administration announced a new policy whereby it would seek to invoke
the privilege only when necessary and as narrowly as possible in each case,
this policy is entirely internal to the administration. It provides no means for
external accountability to check the administration's use of the policy.'39
133. Id. at 63.
134. Id. at 92.
135. Jewel MTD, supra note 122, at 24-25.
136. Jewel MTD, supra note 122, at 25 n. 25 (citing to briefs filed in Al Haramain).
137. Defendants' Notice of Motion and Second Motion to Dismiss in or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment at 14, Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 2008 WL 5552047 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 14, 2008) (No. M:06-CV-01791-VRW); see also Defendants' Reply in Support of Second
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v.
Bush, 2008 WL 1956160 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2008) (No. M:06-CV-01791-VRW).
138. See Letter from Michael Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General, to Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator
(Mar. 31, 2008).
139. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 625, 630 (2010).
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Such external accountability mechanisms would have to come from the
courts or Congress. Yet the legality of such mechanisms is called into
question by the exclusivist positions taken in the Bush and Obama
Administrations.
D. SECRET LAW
In the Introduction, I drew a distinction between extraordinary
prerogative claims and exclusivity. The former, whether conceptualized as
occurring within or outside of the Constitution, are claims of an
extraordinary right to circumvent existing laws on the condition that the
executive make the circumvention transparent to the people or their
representatives and accept whatever judgment they may render. 40
Exclusivity encompasses claims of a far broader presidential discretion to
circumvent laws. It embraces what can fairly be called a "regularized
prerogative." Rather than hinging on fact-specific popular judgments,
exclusivist claims are tautological in that they hinge on the President's own
judgment as to what national security, and in some cases the autonomy of
his office, demand. 4' This is the essence of Richard Nixon's infamous
statement: "when the President does it, that means it is not illegal."'42 It is
also the reasoning underlying John Yoo's remark that whether the President
may legally crush a child's testicles to get information from his parent
"'depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that."" 43 Exclusivity
thus justifies long-term statutory circumvention, so long as the President
deems it essential. Most important for our purposes, regularized
prerogative, or exclusivity, does not demand transparency because public
judgment, outside of that reflected at the ballot box once every four years, is
not essential to it. To the contrary, regularized prerogative intrinsically
leaves room for presidential judgments to the effect that statutory
circumventions must remain secret.
At the apex of the supremacy / secrecy mix, then, is secret law. Secret
law occurs when the executive deems it necessary to the national interest
not only to circumvent a statute, but to do so in secret. One means through
140. See supra at Introduction.
141. See, e.g., Paulsen testimony, supra note 40 at 4 (referring to broad areas of military and
foreign affairs in which the President's judgment is constitutionally exclusive); Eastman, supra
note 37, at 55 ("Congress cannot by mere statute restrict powers that the President holds directly
from the Constitution itself," including his ability to make decisions as commander-in-chief or
chief executive); cf Nat Hentoff, Architect of Torture, VILLAGE VOICE, July 3, 2007 (recounting
statement by John Yoo to the effect that whether the President may legally crush a child's testicles
to get information from his parent "depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that.").
142. See SCHWARZ & HuQ, supra note 45, at 155-56 (quoting Richard Nixon and linking this
sentiment to modem exclusivity claims). Nixon similarly told a congressional committee in 1976
that "any action a president might authorize in the interest of national security," including setting
aside statutes, "would be lawful." Id. at 155.
143. Nat Hentoff, Architect of Torture, VILLAGE VOICE, July 3, 2007 (quoting Yoo).
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which this can occur became apparent in the years after 9/11. That is, the
issuing of secret opinions by the OLC.' The OLC has been called "the
attorney general's lawyer."' 45 It advises the President on the legality of
government actions. 146 Its role gives it tremendous influence, particularly
over matters relating to national security. As Jack Goldsmith, who headed
the OLC from 2003 to 2004 explains, "most legal issues of executive
branch conduct related to war and intelligence never reach a court, or do so
only years after the executive has acted. In these situations, the executive
branch [i.e., the OLC] determines for itself what the law requires, and
whether its actions are legal."' 14' Furthermore, an opinion from the OLC
deeming an action legal is understood, in practice, to immunize the
President and others from prosecution if they later take that action. 48 As
Goldsmith puts it, the OLC possesses "one of the most momentous and
dangerous powers in the government: the power to dispense get-out-of-jail-
free cards.' '1
49
In the wake of 9/11, drafting of and access to controversial OLC
opinions reportedly were restricted to a small group that called itself "the
War Council." It consisted of vice presidential counsel David Addington,
OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, White House Counsel
(later Attorney General) Alberto Gonzales, Timothy Flanigan of the White
House Counsel's Office, and Pentagon general counsel Jim Haynes. 150 The
War Council's most important players were Addington and Yoo.' 5'
Addington's influence stemmed from his ability to speak for the Vice
President (who, in turn, was largely responsible for intelligence matters in
the administration), his intimidating personality, his tendency toward
political retribution, and his relative expertise in constitutional and national
security law.'52 Yoo, meanwhile, was "crucial" to the war council's plans as
its only member who "was an OLC deputy with authority to issue legal
144. See, e.g., Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch
Legal Policy Doesn't Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 579-80, 588-94 (2009).
145. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 18- 19 (2007) (citing DOUGLAS W. KMIEC,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (1992)).
146. Id. at 32; see also Dawn Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1576-77 (2007).
147. GOLDSMITH, supra note 145, at 32.
148. Id. at 96.
149. Id. at 97.
150. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 66 (2008); GOLDSMITH, supra note 145, at 22-23, 98.
151. See MAYER, supra note 150, at 66 (quoting colleague of Addington and Yoo who said,
"It's incredible, but John Yoo and David Addington were running the war on terror almost on
their own."); see also MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 11 ITH CONG., REINING
IN THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH 147 (Jan. 13, 2009) [hereinafter "STAFF REPORT"] (citing
"extraordinary line of communication ... between Mr. Yoo and Mr. Addington").
152. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 145, at 27, 76-79, 170; MAYER, supra note 150, at 63-64.
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opinions that were binding throughout the executive branch."' 53 According
to Goldsmith, Yoo, "[i]n close coordination with the War Council . ..
pumped out [OLC] opinions on all manner of terrorism-related topics." '154
Meanwhile, the War Council shielded their work from prying eyes by
classifying opinions and bypassing ordinary review and access channels
within the executive branch.'55
The War Council thus was able to craft what amounted to secret
amendments to existing statutes-in other words, secret law. It did so by
issuing very closely held opinions that authorized the executive branch to
secretly contravene statutory restrictions, including limits on torture and
warrantless wiretapping. For example, a 2003 OLC opinion asserted that
certain federal criminal laws should not be construed to apply to military
interrogations and that they are unconstitutional if they do so apply. The
justification was exclusivist: "In wartime, it is for the President alone to
decide what methods to use to best prevail against the enemy."' 56 This
Memorandum not only was classified, it was so closely held that it was kept
from even "the top lawyers for each branch of the military."'57 It was
declassified on April 1, 2008, in response to a Freedom of Information Act
lawsuit by the ACLU.'58
In written testimony for a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on the Constitution held on April 30, 2008 (in which I
participated as a witness), former Information Security Oversight Office
director J. William Leonard expressed dismay that the interrogation
memorandum had been classified in the first place. He wrote:
[T]his memorandum represents one of the worst abuses of the
classification process that I had seen during my career, including the
past five years when I had the authority to access more classified
information than almost any other person in the Executive branch.
This memorandum is purely a legal analysis-it is not operational
in nature. Its author was quoted as describing it as "near
boilerplate." To learn that such a document was classified had the
same effect on me as waking up one morning and learning that after
all these years, there is a "secret" Article to the Constitution that the
American people do not even know about. 59
153. GOLDSMITH, supra note 145, at 23.
154. ld. at 98.
155. Id. at 166-67, 205-06.
156. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel of the Dep't of Def. 5 (Mar. 14,
2003); see also id. at 1, 11-13,18-19.
157. Setty, supra note 144, at 592.
158. Id.
159. Secret Law and the Threat to Democratic and Accountable Government: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 10th Cong. 2 (2008) (written
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Leonard stressed the dangers of secret presidential assertions of power to
circumvent law. He also cautioned that multiple such assertions can
compound one another's effects. He wrote:
The combination of these two powers of the President-that is,
when the President lays claim to [powers to circumvent statutes],
but does so in secret-can equate to the very open-ended, non-
circumscribed, executive authority that the Constitution's Framers
sought to avoid in constructing a system of checks and balances.
Added to this is the reality that the President is not irrevocably
bound by his own Executive Orders, and this administration claims
the President can depart from the terms of an Executive Order
without public notice. Thus, at least in theory, the President could
authorize the classification of the OLC memo, even though to do so
would violate the standards of his own governing Executive Order
[on classification policy]. Equally possible, the President could
change his Executive Order governing secrecy, and do so in secret,
all unbeknownst to the Congress and the courts. It is as if Lewis
Carroll, George Orwell, and Franz Kafka jointly conspired to come
up with the ultimate recipe for unchecked executive power.16
Partly as a result of testimony by Bradford Berenson and Dawn
Johnson at the same hearing at which Leonard appeared, Senators Feingold
and Feinstein introduced legislation-the details of which had first been
suggested in an article by Trevor Morrison 61-addressing the use of OLC
opinions as conduits for secret law. 62 The bill would have required the
Attorney General to disclose to Congress any "authoritative interpretation"
of a statute by the Justice Department that deems a law unconstitutional on
Article II grounds or purports to interpret a statute in such a way as to avoid
a constitutional difficulty under Article 11.163 The bill sought, in other
words, to prevent the Department of Justice from secretly and
authoritatively advising the executive branch that it need not obey a statute
or that it may follow a strained interpretation of a statute on exclusivist
grounds.
Yet from an exclusivist perspective, such a bill is unconstitutional
because it could conflict with the President's judgment that the opinions
must be kept secret for purposes of national security or to preserve candor
in executive branch discussions. This was the view taken by Attorney
testimony of J. William Leonard, Former Director, Information Security Oversight Office)
(internal citation omitted).
160. Id. at 8.
161. Trevor W. Morrison, Executive Branch Avoidance and the Need for Congressional
Notification, COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR, Feb. 15, 2007, http://www.columbialawreview.org/
articles/executive-branch-avoidance-and-the-need-for-cngressina-notification.
162. See generally CONG. REC. S8858-S8862 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008).
163. Id.
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General Mukasey. He explained that "to the extent [OLC opinions] are
generated or used to assist in presidential decision-making," they are
subject to executive privilege." 4 He argued, for example, that the bill "could
chill the Department's ability or willingness to provide full and candid legal
assessments of statutes or government actions."' 65 He concluded that the bill
"violates constitutional limits and undermines the public interest protecting
the confidentiality of legal advice vital to the integrity and legality of
government decision-making."' 166
E. DISCRETION TO PUNISH CLASSIFIED SPEECH
The final example involves executive defenses against First
Amendment claims for punishing "classified speech." Classified speech
defenses rest on the notion that executive classification decisions are
decisive as to the harmful nature of the information classified. By this logic,
the decisions preclude much if any independent judicial role in assessing
the same. Under ordinary First Amendment doctrine, a speaker cannot be
punished for speech that could harm national security unless the speaker
intended to, and was likely to, incite imminent illegal action through the
speech.'67 And while the government has more leeway to punish its
employees' speech under First Amendment doctrine, that leeway pertains
mainly to employment-related repercussions rather than to criminal or civil
punishments. 168 Even with respect to job-related repercussions, First
Amendment doctrine grants employees some limited protection. 169 From a
supremacist perspective, however, such protections do not apply where the
speech at issue is classified. Rather, classification effectively transforms
speech into something akin to government property. Alternatively, if still
speech, it is transformed into speech that ipse dixit can be deemed to cause
sufficient national security harm to be unprotected.
To place the issue in context, it is useful to start with some background
on the classification system itself. Beyond the fact that the system is largely
a product of executive order, 7 ' two points are of particular importance.
164. Letter from Michael Mukasey, U.S. Attorney General., on the Constitutionality of the
OLC Reporting Act of 2008, 2008 WL 5533799 (O.L.C.) at 3.
165. Id. at 5.
166. Id
167. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Alternatively, if Brandenberg were
deemed only to apply to advocacy rather than information disclosure, the default test for classified
speech restrictions would be that applied to content-based regulations of speech, or strict scrutiny.
Under strict scrutiny, speech is punishable for its content only if the law at issue is the least
restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest. See, e.g., United States. v. Playboy
Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
168. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-20 (2006).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING
AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S. Doc. NO. 105-2, at XXXVIII, 5, 11-13 (1997);
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First, the classification system exemplifies the fact that claims of
presidential power are frequently made to defend decisions made not by the
President but by others in the executive branch. Given the millions of
documents classified yearly, the President obviously does not make most
classification decisions himself. Rather, several million people have some
form of classification authority in the United States. Of that number, 2,557
had "original classification" authority as of the end of fiscal year (FY)
2009.' This marks a decrease from previous years, reportedly caused by
agency anticipation of Obama Administration efforts to get the
classification system under tighter control. The average number of original
classifiers between FY 1980 and FY 2008 was 5 ,4 00.172 Original classifiers
are "authorized to determine what information, if disclosed without
authorization, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national
security.""' Additionally, original classifiers create classification guides.
Such guides are instructions for "derivative classifiers." A guide "is a set of
instructions issued.., which identifies elements of information regarding a
specific subject that might be classified and establishes the level and
duration of classification for each such element."' 174 The remaining several
million persons with classification authority are derivative classifiers. 7 5 In
theory, derivative classifiers lack policy discretion because their decisions
are derived from original classification decisions. 76 In actuality, of course,
determining what is derivative of already classified information-short of
exact replicas of the latter-itself entails discretion. This is particularly so
where the basis for derivative classification is the following of classification
guides. Concerns have long been raised about lack of proper-and
sometimes any-training for derivative classifiers and agency failures to
update classification guides. The Obama Administration's Executive Order
on classification, EO 13526, acknowledges and does attempt to address
some of these longstanding problems. Specifically, it imposes training and
guidebook review requirements and mandates that derivative classification
HAROLD C. RELYEA, SECURITY CLASSIFIED AND CONTROLLED INFORMATION: HISTORY, STATUS
AND EMERGING MANAGEMENT ISSUES 2-5 (2007); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 338-41 (1973). A few discrete categories of information are classified by
statute. See, e.g., NATHAN BROOKS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP., THE PROTECTION OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 2 n.7 (2004), available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/pdf/CRS.security4.pdf; S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 5, 15, 23-24.




174. Id. at 7.
175. Precise numbers of derivative classifiers are not recorded given the fluid means by which
they are designated. A 1997 Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government
Secrecy estimated that "three million government and industry employees ... have the ability to
mark information as classified." MOYNIHAN, supra note 170, at 31.
176. ISOO 2009 REPORT, supra note 171, at 7.
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markings identify their author.'77
The second important point about the current system is that there long
has been widespread concern across the political spectrum about rampant
overclassification. J. William Leonard, the former director of the
Information Security Oversight Office, acknowledges a problem of
"excessive classification." Leonard says that he has "seen information
classified that [he's] also seen published in third-grade textbooks."'7
Former New Jersey governor and 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas
Keane has said that "three-quarters of the classified material he reviewed
for the [9/11] Commission should not have been classified in the first
place."' 79 "The Moynihan Commission," a committee led by Senator
Patrick Moynihan in the 1990s to study government secrecy, observed in
their 1997 report that "[t]he classification system ... is used too often to
deny the public an understanding of the policymaking process, rather than
for the necessary protection of intelligence activities and other highly
sensitive matters."' 8° And Erwin N. Griswold, former Solicitor General
under Richard Nixon, deemed it "apparent to any person who has
considerable experience with classified material that there is massive
overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with
national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of one sort
or another."'' Statistics give an additional sense of the classification
system's reach.As noted above, there presently are several million persons
with some form of classification authority. The number of new
classification decisions-including combined original and derivative
decisions to classify-averaged 16.1 million per year from FY 1996
through FY 2009.182
While prosecutions for classified speech have been very rare, we can
gain some insight into the supremacist reasoning underlying them by
reviewing the legal arguments that the government made in their pursuit. In
the 2005 case of United States v. Rosen & Weissman,83 the Bush
Administration initiated the first criminal prosecution in U.S. history
against non-government employees for disseminating classified
information. Both Rosen and Weissman were lobbyists for the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee ("AIPAC"). According to the District
Court in the case, "AIPAC is a pro-Israel organization that lobbies the
United States executive and legislative branches on issues of interest to
177. EO 13526, §§ 1.9, 2.1(b)(1), (d).
178. Scott Shane, Since 2001, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the
Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at Al.
179. 108 CONG. REC. S9714 (2004) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
180. S. Doc. No. 105-2, at xxi.
181. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
182. ISOO 2009 REPORT, supra note 171, at 9.
183. See 445 F.Supp.2d 602 (E.D.Va. 2006) (order denying motion to dismiss).
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Israel, especially U.S. foreign policy with respect to the Middle East.""'
The District Court summarized the indictment against Rosen and Weissman
as follows:
In general, the.., indictment [against Rosen and Weissman] alleges
that in furtherance of their lobbying activities, defendants (i)
cultivated relationships with government officials with access to
sensitive U.S. government information . . . (ii) obtained the
information from these officials, and (iii) transmitted the
information to persons not otherwise entitled to receive it, including
members of the media, foreign policy analysts, and officials of a
foreign government.'85
The Government's core argument in the case was that Rosen and Weissman
engaged in punishable conduct, not protected speech. Specifically, they
"conspire[d] to steal national defense information" and to "pass on this
stolen property to someone not entitled by its owner to have it."' 86
The government also noted that the Espionage Act, under which Rosen
and Weissman were prosecuted, does not punish conveyance of all
classified information. Rather, it punishes conveyance of classified
information that relates to the national defense to those not entitled to
receive it. Furthermore, in the case of oral communications such as those
engaged in by Rosen and Weissman, the statute requires the possessor to
have "reason to believe [that the information] could be used to the injury of
the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation."' 87
While the government was wise to give the court an alternative basis to
find in their favor-specifically, that the Espionage Act covers just a subset
of classified information-it nonetheless made clear its positions that (1)
the defendants engaged in thievery with no First Amendment implications
because the information's classified status made it government property and
(2) alternatively, if the court finds the defendants to have engaged in
speech, it is speech that deserves no First Amendment protection because it
is classified and it relates to the national defense. With respect to the latter
point, the government cites a line of cases from 1919 in which the Supreme
Court articulated the famous "clear and present danger test."'88 Yet the
Court in those cases-and more so in later cases that substantially narrowed
the test, protecting speech unless the speaker intends, and the speech is
likely, to imminently incite illegal activity-made clear that the
184. Id. at 607-08.
185. Id. at 608.
186. Government's Supplemental Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Superseding Indictment at 22, 29-30, United States v. Rosen, 445 F.Supp.2d 602 (E.D. Va. Mar.
31, 2006) (No. 1:05 cr225) [hereinafter Government's Supplemental Response].
187. Id. at 34 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 793(e)).
188. Id. at 23-24.
Supremely Opaque?
determination of harm is for courts to make.189 Nonetheless, the government
cites the cases to suggest that the speech at issue is categorically
unprotected. 9 In short, the government's central argument is that the
classification label is determinative because it transforms information into
government property.'91 The government's alternative argument is that the
classification label is determinative because it equates-at least for
information that relates to the national defense-to a judicial finding of
"clear and present danger.' 92
With respect to government employee leaks, there was only one
successful prosecution prior to the George W. Bush Administration for
leaking outside of a classic espionage or spying context, such as leaking to
the press.' 93 The case, United States v. Morison, 194 was brought against
Samuel Morison. Morison was an employee of the Naval Intelligence
Support Center ("NISC"). As an employee, he had signed a nondisclosure
agreement regarding classified and other sensitive information. While still
employed by NISC, he leaked satellite photographs of a Soviet air carrier to
Jane's Fighting Ships (Jane's), an annual British publication about
international naval operations. Morison had had an ongoing relationship
with Jane's and at the time of the leak was seeking permanent employment
from Jane's. He was convicted under the Espionage Act for leaking
classified national defense information.'95 It seems a fair assumption that
the Fourth Circuit and District Court opinions in the case-both of which
took strong supremacist positions-reflect arguments pressed by the
government. Extrapolating from the opinions, the government arguments
seemed to largely parallel those made years later in Rosen. First, the
government apparently argued that Morison had not engaged in speech at
all and that his prosecution thus raised no First Amendment problems.
Instead, Morrison had engaged in theft and had violated employment
terms.' 96 The Morison opinions also reflected a secondary argument that,
even if First Amendment concerns were at issue, the statute is sufficiently
narrow to alleviate them because it covers only speech that is closely held
by the government, that the speaker intentionally provides to one not
189. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47
(1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
190. Government's Supplemental Response, supra note 186, at 23-24.
191. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 188, 190 and accompanying text.
193. Technically, there was one other prosecution-that of former Defense Department
employee Daniel Ellsberg for leaking the papers that sparked the Pentagon Papers case. The
Ellsberg prosecution was dismissed on non-merits grounds at the district court level, however, due
to ethical improprieties by the government. SANFORD J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS AND THE PAPERS 4,
6-9 (1972) (Morningside ed., Columbia Univ. Press., 1989).
194. 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
195. Id. at 1062-63.
196. Id. at 1068-70; U.S. v. Morison, 604 F.Supp. 655, 664 (D.Md. 1985).
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entitled to see it and that, if disclosed, could "potentially" damage the
United States or "might" be useful to an enemy of the United States.'97
Drawing from the Morison opinions, then, the government appears to have
taken the position, as it did years later in Rosen, that classified information
is government property and its transmission thus amounts to theft rather
than protected speech. Alternatively, the government appears to have
argued that classification status-or at least, as reflected in the Fourth
Circuit's opinion, classification status plus a judicial finding that the
disclosure could "potentially" damage the U.S. or "might" be useful to an
enemy of the nation-replaces the substantially more searching judicial
review that would otherwise apply to a speech prosecution.
In addition to shedding light on the government's positions in the case,
the appeals court opinion in U.S. v. Morison marks the only federal judicial
holding to date (apart from the District Court opinion that it affirmed) on
the First Amendment status of classified information leaks by government
employees. As noted above, the majority opinion took the view that
classification turns information into government property and thus removes
it from the purview of the First Amendment when the information is
transmitted by a government employee to one not entitled to receive it. One
of the judges on the three-judge panel joined that opinion but also
concurred separately to suggest the slightly less radical view that the case
implicates First Amendment rights, but that the court should defer very
heavily to the political branches (both to executive judgment as evidenced
through classification and that of Congress in passing the Espionage Act)
rather than conduct an independent analysis of the facts.'98 The third judge
in the case wrote a separate opinion that largely echoed the latter position,
though expressed a bit more reticence about extreme judicial deference.199
The Rosen case also offers an example of judicial reasoning on
classified speech, in that case as disseminated by private citizens. The
picture from Rosen is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, in a 2006
opinion-issued in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss the
indictment on First Amendment grounds-the court sounded fairly
supremacist notes, suggesting that classification might effectively be
decisive in making speech punishable. 00 Yet a subsequent opinion softened
the earlier one's radical potential. Among other things, that opinion, issued
in February 2009, clarified that the jury must independently determine if the
Espionage Act's criteria for illegal communications were met. It explained
that:
197. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071-76; Morison, 604 F.Supp. at 660-61, 664.
198. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1084 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 1085-86 (Phillips, J., concurring).
200. Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
881,902-03.
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evidence that information is classified is, at most, evidence that the
government intended that the designated information be closely
held. Yet, evidence that information is classified is not conclusive
on this point .... Further, the government's classification decision
is inadmissible hearsay on the second prong of the [statutory
definition of "national defense information"], namely whether
unauthorized disclosure might potentially damage the United States
or an enemy of the United States.'O
The judicial record on classified speech, in short, is both sparse and
mixed. Adding to the uncertainty is the famous Supreme Court case of New
York Times v. United States. 2 2 The case did not directly involve a
prosecution for classified speech. In it, the Nixon Administration sought a
prior restraint against the New York Times to prevent it from publishing
excerpts from a leaked classified historical study on Vietnam policy known
as the Pentagon Papers.0 3 As such, the Court's short per curiam opinion
denying the government's request focused solely on the high First
Amendment threshold to obtain a prior restraint.2"4 Yet in concurrences and
dissents, several Justices evinced supremacist leanings, suggesting that
statutes or even executive regulations authorizing post-publication
prosecutions might be constitutional °.2 5 All in all, then, there remain many
open questions as to how far courts will go in embracing supremacist
reasoning in the context of classified speech. Naturally, this creates
uncertainty for government and speaker alike. It does, however, leave the
government with supremacist reasoning to which it can point, particularly
from Morison and the separate opinions in New York Times, in pursuing or
threatening prosecutions.
Prosecutions and threatened prosecutions indeed are on an upswing, in
keeping with supremacy's trajectory generally. As noted, the Bush
Administration indicted Rosen and Weissman in the first Espionage Act
case in history brought against private citizens for exchanging information
outside of a classic espionage or spying context. The Bush Administration
also pursued prosecutions of government employee leaks to the press and
lobbyists with vigor. Most notably, the Administration opened a criminal
investigation on Thomas Tamm, a former Department of Justice official
who leaked the news of the TSP to the New York Times, culminating in a
Pulitzer Prize winning expose of the program.2"6 The Administration also
201. U.S. v. Rosen, 599 F.Supp.2d 690, 695 (E.D.Va. 2009) (emphasis added).
202. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
203. Id. at 714 (per curiam); see also United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325-
26 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded and stay continued, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
204. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. 714 (per curiam).
205. See Kitrosser, supra note 200, at 897-99.
206. See Joe Conason, A Whistle-Blower Who Needs Obama and Holder's Protection, SALON,
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opened a grand jury investigation and issued subpoenas to reporters and
others in an effort find sources for the TSP and other stories.2°7 To place
these events in a larger context, "[a] 2007 study by the Reporters
Committee for the Freedom of the Press found a five-fold increase since
2001 in subpoenas seeking information on a media outlet's confidential
sources." 2°8 The Administration also indicted Lawrence Franklin, a former
State Department official who passed to AIPAC lobbyists Rosen and
Weisman the information that they were accused of disclosing further.
Franklin pled guilty in 2005 and agreed to cooperate in the prosecution of
Rosen and Weisman. °9
While many commentators expected the Obama Administration to take
a less aggressive posture toward leaks to the press, these expectations have
been upended. As journalist Scott Shane observed in June of 2010, "[i]n 17
months in office, President Obama has already outdone every previous
president in pursuing leak prosecutions. '21 0 Within that time period the
Obama Administration had indicted two former government officials for
leaks to the press-Thomas Drake, a former National Security Agency
official who passed classified information regarding alleged agency
mismanagement to a Baltimore Sun reporter,211 and Shamai Leibowitz, a
former FBI linguist who pled guilty to passing classified information to a
Apr. 17, 2009, available at http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/joe conason/2009/04/17/
whistleblower; Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 2008,
available at http://www.newsweek.comI/2008/12/12/the-fed-who-blew-the-whistle.html; see also
Letter from Steven A. Tyrell, Chief of Fraud Section, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Paul
F. Kemp, Esq. (Dec. 31, 2008).
207. Laura Rozen, Hung Out to Dry, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV., January/February 2009,
33, 33-34; Philip Shenon, Leak Inquiry Said to Focus on Calls with Times, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/washington/12eak.html; Dan Eggen, Grand Jury
Probes News Leaks at NSA, WASH. POST, July 29, 2006, A2, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/28/AR2006072801606.html; Scott Shane, Leak of Classified
Information Prompts Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, A10, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9903EED7123FF93AA 15754COA9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
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Oct. 5, 2005); see also Josh Gerstein, Leniency for AIPAC Leaker, POLITICO, June I, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0609/23671.html; Jerry Markon, Defense Analyst Guilty in
Israeli Espionage Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/05/AR2005100501608.html.
210. Scott Shane, Administration Takes a Hard Line Against Leaks to the Press, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/20l0/06/12/us/politics/12leak.html; see also, e.g.,
Michael Isikoff, The Obama Administration's Next Leaker Prosecution?, NEWSWEEK, May 28,
2010, available at http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/2010/05/28/the-obama-
administration-s-next-leaker-prosecution-.html.
211. Isikoff, supra note 210; Josh Gerstein, Justice Dept. Cracks Down on Leaks, POLITICO,
May 25, 2010, available at http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0510/37721.html; Jesselyn
Radack, When Whistle-Blowers Suffer, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at A13,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/27/opinion/la-oe-radack-20100427.
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blogger." 2 As one commentator noted after Leibowitz pled guilty, "'If
Thomas Drake is convicted and sent to jail, this will be the first president to
send two leakers to prison in his term in office.""'2 " The Obama
Administration also renewed a Bush era grand jury investigation and
subpoena of New York Times reporter James Risen regarding Risen's 2006
book, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush
Administration.214 And while the Obama Administration voluntarily
dismissed the prosecution of ATPAC lobbyists Rosen and Weissman in May
of 2009, it signaled that it did so for pragmatic, not ideological reasons. In
its motion to dismiss the Administration cited its "disagreement with some
of the legal rulings in this case," presumably referring to the court's
February 2009 order. It observed that "[t]he landscape of [the] case has
changed significantly since it was first brought. 215
The Obama Administration had also, as of Fall 2010, kept open the
criminal investigation against Thomas Tamm that was initiated on
December 30, 2005.216 As Michael Isikoff wrote in 2008:
The FBI has pursued [Tamm] relentlessly for the past two and a half
years. Agents have raided his house, hauled away personal
possessions and grilled his wife, a teenage daughter and a grown
son. More recently, they've been questioning Tamm's friends and
associates about nearly every aspect of his life. Tamm has resisted
pressure to plead to a felony for divulging classified information.
But he is living under a pall, never sure if or when federal agents
might arrest him. 217
So long as the case remains in the investigation stage, rather than being
tried or even brought to indictment, the government's evidence is not
subject to external checks. Many consider this troubling, arguing that
Tamm's disclosures benefited the nation and did no harm to national
security. 218 Regardless of whether these critics are wrong or right, the fact is
that the exclusivist equating of classification with illegality gives the
government a basis to keep an investigation open for years, regardless of
whether it could prevail at trial or even obtain an indictment.
Similarly, when defendants plead guilty to leaking classified
information, factual questions as to whether any harms meet statutory or
constitutional standards are never put to the test. In the case of Lawrence
Franklin, for example, who pled guilty to leaking information to AIPAC
212. Gerstein, supra note 211.
213. Id. (quoting Gabriel Schoenfeld).
214. Isikoff, supra note 210; Gerstein, supra note 211.
215. Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Rosen, 557 F.3d 192
(4th Cir. May 1, 2009) (No. 08-4358).
216. See Radack, supra note 211; Conason, supra note 206.
217. Isikoff, supra note 210.
218. See, e.g., id.
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lobbyists Rosen and Weissman, the judge in the case deemed it "'very
disputable' whether some of the information at the heart of the case was
actually the kind of 'national defense information' it is illegal to relay
outside the government." '2 19 In the case of FBI linguist Shamai Leibowitz,
who also pled guilty to leaking classified information the U.S. District
Court Judge who handled the case acknowledged that he did not know what
information was disclosed or whether the disclosures were damaging. As
Josh Gerstein reports:
[Judge] Williams [said] that while he assumed that the disclosures
had a serious impact on national security, he really didn't know
because he wasn't privy to what information was disclosed and
what impact it had.
"The court is in the dark," the judge said. "I'm not a part and parcel
of the intricacies of that ... I don't know what was divulged, other
than some documents. 22 °
The recent uptick in classified speech prosecutions and investigations
lengthens the shadow of exclusivist approaches to classified speech. To
understand this shadow effect and its importance, it helps to recognize that
information leaking is a way of life in U.S. government and journalism. As
one observer put it, "the leaking of classified information is routine in
Washington, where such data is traded as a kind of currency.
'
"221
Furthermore, it is well known and long acknowledged that much leaking
comes from the White House itself and this practice dates back at least to
the administration of Theodore Roosevelt. 22  Indeed, it is a well-worn joke
that "the ship of state is the only vessel that leaks from the top.
223
Administrations have long selectively leaked classified information that
puts them in a favorable light while guarding less favorable information.
2 4
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Among the most important shadow effects of classified speech
supremacy is the selective chilling effect that it can have on journalists and
government leakers. Those who leak information that paints an
administration in a bad light-revealing illegal, unethical, or incompetent
behavior, for example-have much to fear in an environment in which
prosecutions occur and are threatened regularly. Long-time investigative
journalist Seymour Hersh explains how this fear impacts federal employees
and media institutions alike:
Bureaucrats who in the past would have resisted leak-investigation
demands from the administration, Hersh says, are today "more
compliant." Hersh says that back in the 1970s, when he broke a
story about the government spying on Americans, a top Justice
Department official (Gerald Ford's attorney general Edward Levi)
told those in the White House (including Ford's chief of staff Dick
Cheney) who were seeking to pursue a leak investigation against
Hersh, "Are you kidding? Get the hell out of here." Not any more.
And that sense of fear and intimidation has seeped into the DNA of
media institutions as well.225
The chilling effect is compounded by recent legislative changes-
themselves enacted partly in response to supremacist arguments-that give
administrations more leeway to conduct electronic surveillance. These
changes, say reporters, make sources reluctant to talk for fear that their
conversations will be overheard by the government.22 6
Finally, a few words are in order regarding WikiLeaks, the website
which in the past several months (as of this writing) has generated great
controversy for disseminating large troves of classified documents on its
website and to selected newspapers. As of early December 2010 (when
final edits on this article were made), WikiLeaks and its founder Julian
Assange faced a storm of criticism from members of the media and from
Republican and Democratic politicians alike, stemming most directly from
WikiLeaks' November and December 2010 disclosures of international
diplomatic cables. To provide a small sampling of these remarks: U.S.
Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell deemed Assange a terrorist
who must be prosecuted.227 Representative Pete King similarly urged the
Justice Department to classify WikiLeaks as a "foreign terrorist
organization" and to prosecute Assange for espionage. 28 Former Alaska
225. Rozen, supra note 207, at 35.
226. See Samantha Fredrickson, Tapping into the Reporter's Notebook, THE NEWS MEDIA &
THE L., Fall 2008, at 10, 10-11.
227. Associated Press, Senate GOP Leader: WikiLeaks Head a "Terrorist," Dec. 5, 2010,
available at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/12/05/us us wikileaks mcconnell.
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world/2010/11/28/2010-11-28_media unveils classified documents via wikileaks website in
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Governor Sarah Palin accused Assange of "treason" and lamented that
Assange has not been "'pursued with the same urgency we pursue Al Qaeda
and Taliban leaders." 2 9 Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich said
that "Julian Assange is engaged in terrorism. He should be treated as an
enemy combatant. WikiLeaks should be closed down permanently and
decisively. '23" A column in the Wall Street Journal also suggested that
Assange could be deemed an enemy combatant and that those who provide
classified documents to WikiLeaks should be subject to the death penalty. 3
And former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee "called for the execution of
Bradley Manning, the 23-year-old US army intelligence analyst who is in
custody at a military base in Virginia, facing trial for downloading the files
while on duty in Iraq. 232
Beyond its ongoing prosecution of Manning, the U.S. Justice
Department recently opened a criminal investigation into WikiLeaks for
possible Espionage Act violations.233  And U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman,
who chairs the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee, urged private
internet service providers to cease all assistance to WikiLeaks, and several
providers have done just that.234 In a statement released after internet giant
Amazon.com announced that its servers would no longer host WikiLeaks,
Lieberman said: "'[Amazon's] decision to cut off WikiLeaks now is the
right decision and should set the standard for other companies WikiLeaks is
using to distribute its illegally seized material. I call on any other company
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While the saga continues to unfold as of this writing, three general
observations seem warranted at this point. First, the government's legal
arguments in any ongoing or future prosecutions will almost certainly echo
the supremacist positions that have been invoked in the past with respect to
prosecutions for leaking or disseminating classified information. That is,
while the government will likely deem the disclosures at issue particularly
dangerous, it will suggest that its burden is only to show that the disclosures
were classified and relate to national security. In the alternative, the
government will likely suggest that if it must show some harm from the
disclosures, the threshold for the demonstration is dramatically lower than it
would be were non-classified speech at issue. Second, amendments to
strengthen the Espionage Act to make it easier to prosecute Assange have
already been proposed as of this writing.236 It seems likely that supporters
of such legislation will deem any First Amendment concerns de minimis in
light of supremacist reasoning. Third, supremacy's shadow effect has
already played an important role in the public debate over WikiLeaks. As
illustrated above, a number of prominent U.S. commentators and politicians
appear to take as a given the illegality of the disclosures made to and
disseminated by WikiLeaks. Presumably, this assumption stems from the
twin premises that leaking and disseminating classified information is
categorically illegal and that such illegality, given supremacist reasoning, is
constitutional. Indeed, such widespread, casual assumptions of criminality
are particularly striking when juxtaposed with a recent statement by
Defense Secretary Robert Gates:
But let me-let me just offer some perspective as somebody who's
been at this a long time. Every other government in the world
knows the United States government leaks like a sieve, and it has
for a long time. And I dragged this up the other day when I was
looking at some of these prospective releases. And this is a quote
from John Adams: "How can a government go on, publishing all of
their negotiations with foreign nations, I know not. To me, it
appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel."...
Now, I've heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy
described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think-I
think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The
fact is, governments deal with the United States because it's in their
interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not
because they believe we can keep secrets.
236. See, e.g., Kevin Poulsen, Lieberman Introduces Anti-WikiLeaks Legislation, WIRED.COM,
Dec. 2, 2010, http://www.wired.com/threatievel/2010/12/shield.
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Many governments-some governments deal with us because they
fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us.
We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable
nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will
continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive
information with one another. Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it
awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly
modest.237
CONCLUSION
Supremacist approaches to presidential power are increasingly
influential. This fact has important normative implications. As I make clear
in the Introduction and in other work, my own view is that supremacy
misreads the Constitution. It conflates the President's structural capacities
with a legal right to exercise the same in the face of inter-branch checks. As
such, it blocks mechanisms by which presidential misdeeds can be
discovered by the other branches or the people. Overall, it undermines those
aspects of the constitutional design that assume and provide for presidential
accountability.
Yet while this Article is a step in a larger normative project,238 the
Article itself is meant to be largely descriptive. Specifically, it describes
supremacy, its justifications, its various manifestations, and the impact of
those manifestations upon transparency. Regardless of what one ultimately
thinks of supremacy, it is important to understand it and its implications,
given its growing influence.
Perhaps the Article's most foundational descriptive mission is simply to
identify supremacy as a distinct school of thought in the first place.
Exclusivity, state secrets privilege, executive privilege, and classified
speech have each received their fair share of scholarly, judicial, and
political branch attention. Yet little attention has been paid to the common
constitutional underpinnings of these seemingly distinct areas of thought.
This Article seeks to identify common interpretive threads that run through
them. Furthermore, it seeks to point out a common historical trajectory
whereby supremacist arguments have, for the most part, grown increasingly
radical over time. Indeed, some modern supremacist claims rely partly on
ancestral claims that were not themselves supremacist, like the executive
237. Jack Goldsmith, Realism 101 on WikiLeaks, Dec. I, 2010, available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/realism-I 01 -on-wikileaks/.
238. Indeed, much of this Article will form a chapter in a forthcoming book project, and
subsequent chapters will elaborate on the argument that supremacy is inconsistent with the
Constitution due partly to supremacy's impact on transparency and accountability.
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privilege claims of the Washington Administration.
Finally, this Article seeks to describe the relationship between
supremacy and transparency. As outlined in the Introduction, accountability
is central to the constitutional design of the presidency. Accountability, in
turn-both logically and as evidenced by history-assumes that the other
branches and the people have meaningful access to information. Regardless
of one's ultimate legal or policy judgments about supremacy, its impact on
government transparency-both that of specific claim types, and of
supremacist claims combined-should be considered and addressed.
